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Hate Speech in Context:
The Case of Verbal Threats*
JOHN T. NOCKLEBYt
"Whether a particular act or message is... entitled to First Amendment
protection turns on context as well as content."
-Justice John Paul Stevens**
"A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged; it is the skin of a
living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the
circumstances and the time in which it is used."
-Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.***
"Fuck you, Nigger Bitch!"
-- Screamed five times by a white motorcyclist at
a passing motorist the day before the Los Ange-
les Riots began on April 29, 1992.****
* © John T. Nockleby. All rights reserved.
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INTRODUCTION
Jn the last few years a number of scholars have considered the
problem of hate speech and have proposed law reforms to address
those problems.' In particular, some critical race theorists have ob-
jected to the way in which the First Amendment has been inter-
preted to protect and defend racist speech and, not incidentally in
their view, to protect and defend racism.2 Joining debate with the
critical race scholars have been a number of other scholars who have
1. Dozens of articles have addressed this problem. See, e.g., Cynthia Grant Bowman,
Street Harassment and the Informal Ghettoization of Women, 106 HARV. L. REV. 517
(1993); Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in Colli-
sion, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 343 (1990) [hereinafter Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules]; Kent
Greenawalt, Insults and Epithets: Are They Protected Speech?, 42 RUTGERS L. REV. 287
(1991) [hereinafter Greenawalt, Insults and Epithets]; Thomas C. Grey, Civil Rights v.
Civil Liberties: The Case of Discriminatory Verbal Harassment, SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y,
Spring 1991, at 81; Thomas David Jones, Article 4 of the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the First Amendment, 23 HOW.
L.J. 429 (1980); David Kretzmer, Freedom of Speech and Racism, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 445
(1987); Kenneth Lasson, Racial Defamation as Free Speech: Abusing the First Amend-
ment, 17 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 11 (1985); Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let
Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431 [hereinafter Law-
rence, If He Hollers]; Frederick M. Lawrence, Resolving the Hate Crimes/Hate Speech
Paradox: Punishing Bias Crimes and Protecting Racist Speech, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
673 (1993); Toni M. Massaro, Equality and Freedom of Expression: The Hate Speech Di-
lemma, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211 (1991); Frank Michelman, Universities, Racist
Speech and Democracy in America: An Essay for the ACLU, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
339 (1992); Martha Minow, Speaking and Writing Against Hate, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1393
(1990); Rodney A. Smolla, Rethinking First Amendment Assumptions About Racist and
Sexist Speech, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 171 (1990); Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist
Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990 DUKE L.J. 484.
2. See generally DEREK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (rev. ed. 1989); John 0. Cal-
more, Critical Race Theory, Archie Shepp, and Fire Music: Securing an Authentic Intellec-
tual Life in a Multi-Cultural World, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2129 (1992); Kimberle Williams
Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Anti-
discrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988); David Hall, The Constitution and
Race: A Critical Perspective, 5 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 229 (1988); Charles R. Lawrence
III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN.
L. REV. 317 (1987) [hereinafter Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection]; Judy
Scales-Trent, Black Women and the Constitution: Finding Our Place, Asserting Our
Rights, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 9 (1989); Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Re-
constructing Ideals From Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401 (1987);
Robert A. Williams, Jr., Documents of Barbarism: The Contemporary Legacy of European
Racism and Colonialism in the Narrative Traditions of Federal Indian Law, 31 ARIZ. L.
REV. 237 (1989).
Mari Matsuda defines racism as "the structural subordination of a group based on an
idea of racial inferiority." Mar J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering
the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2358 (1989). She argues that racist speech is
"harmful because it is a mechanism of subordination, reinforcing a historical vertical re-
lationship." Id; see also MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL, WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE
THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AENDMENT (1993).
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taken a variety of positions on whether, and if so to what extent,
various social institutions should attempt to regulate hate speech.'
Many of these commentators have critiqued the proposals of the
critical race theorists and others as being insufficiently sensitive to
First Amendment issues.4
The debate over hate speech has frequently appeared to require
a choice between two competing paradigms:5 should virulent, racist
speech that continues to infect our society, promote racism and un-
dermine equality be regulated, at least to some degree? Or, does the
idea of a free, open, "tolerant" 6 and democratic society, one in which
the space for unpopular and controversial ideas seems all too nar-
row, require that we allow such speech to go unpunished and un-
regulated?
These paradigms reveal that, on the one hand, hate speech-
like speech that excludes people from employment, housing or vot-
ing, and violates civil rights laws-constitutes discrimination.7 On.
3. Compare Hadley Arkes, Civility and the Restriction of Speech: Rediscovering the
Defamation of Groups, 1974 SUP. Or. REV. 281; Donald A. Downs, Skokie Revisited: Hate
Group Speech and the First Amendment, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 629 (1985); Mary Ellen
Gale, Reimagining the First Amendment: Racist Speech and Equal Liberty, 65 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 119 (1991); Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 255 (1992) with
LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREE SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN
AMERICA (1986); William Shaun Alexander, Regulating Speech on Campus: A Plea for
Tolerance, 26 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1349 (1991); Charles Fried, The New First Amend-
ment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 225 (1992); David Gold-
berger, Sources of Judicial Reluctance to Use Psychic Harm as a Basis for Suppressing
Racist, Sexist and Ethnically Offensive Speech, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 1165 (1991).
4. See, e.g., Robert C. Post, Free Speech and Religious, Racial, and Sexual Harass-
ment: Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 267
(1991) [hereinafter Post, Free Speech]; see also Kingsley Browne, Title VII as Censorship:
Hostile-Environment Harassment and the First Amendment, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 481 (1991);
Goldberger, supra note 3; Kenneth L. Karst, Boundaries and Reasons: Freedom of Ex-
pression and the Subordination of Groups, 1990 U. I.L. L. REv. 95.
5. See, e.g., Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules, supra note 1, at 345-46; see gene-
ally Massaro, supra note 1. Much of what I say in this Article applies equally to speech
that attacks people because of their gender, ethnicity, sexual orientatfon, or religion.
However, the issues involving these other kinds of discriminatory speech involve different
cultural and historical backgrounds, and so, consistent with my emphasis upon context,
this Article is focused upon racial-and not on other types--of threats.
6. See BOLLINGER, supra note 3.
7. I spent most of the 1980s as a civil rights lawyer litigating cases that directly
raised questions about what some people could say and do to others without violating the.
civil rights laws prohibiting discrimination in employment, housing or voting. Many of
the people I represented-usually people of color, but sometimes women and older white
men raising age discrimination claims-spoke passionately about discrimination that fre-
quently was conducted through words: harassing speech, threatening speech, "we-don't-
hire-your-kind" type speech, "whites only" signs, or comments that evidenced a stereo-
typical attitude towards people of a certain background, and the like. These types of
speech were perceived as exclusionary-the victims immediately recognized that its pur-
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the other hand, some hate speech is also part of a national discus-
sion about race.' Like Robert Post, Ken Karst and Charles Law-
rence, I believe that it is crucial to continue our collective conversa-
tion about race and the meaning of racial difference.9 Only through
talking about race can people of different racial identities possibly
learn how to live together in more respectful ways and perceive more
than just the chasms that separate them from others. The dilemma
confronting all of us is the extent to which it is possible to create the
conditions for "free discussion" about race while simultaneously
eliminating discrimination resulting from speech.
Posing the problem of hate speech in the abstract tends to po-
larize the conversation. Arguing at the level of general principle, i.e.,
discrimination versus fee speech, prevents us from seeing how
much agreement there may be in specific situations. For example, in
her crucial 1989 article, Professor Mari Matsuda powerfully de-
scribed the harms that are created by some forms of hate speech. 10
In response, a number of authors repeatedly referred to the problem
as one of regulating merely "offensive" speech, as though Professor
Matsuda were talking about banning public profanity.11 If any pro-
pose was to exclude them from equal opportunities in employment, housing or voting. It
was not just that speech accompanied discrimination; speech constituted the discrimina-
tion. Threats of violence that cause African-Americans to move out of a neighborhood may
be expressed through words, but those words in themselves function as discrimination.
For this reason, I cannot agree with the argument that those who are concerned with
fighting racism should focus their energies on "racist acts" which they suppose are the
opposite of racist "speech." See, e.g., Thomas W. Simon, Fighting Racism: Hate Speech
Detours, 26 IND. L. REV. 411 (1993); Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Let Them Talk, 37 THE NEW
REPUBLIC, Sept. 20, 1993, at 37, 43; see also FRANKLYN S. HAIMAN, "SPEECH ACTs" AND
THE FIRST AMiENDMtENT 26-35 (1993) (distinguishing generally between acts which dis-
criminate and racist speech). Distinguishing racist speech from discriminatory conduct
may be appropriate in some contexts and for some forms of discriminatory speech-such
as stereotyped comments uttered in a university environment-but when hate speech in-
timidates people of color from purchasing homes in white neighborhoods, the argument
that fighting racism means fighting some other battle is misplaced. See State v. Talley,
858 P.2d 217 (Wash. 1993) (involving a mixed race couple who withdrew from house pur-
chase after a neighbor burned a cross).
8. By "national discussion about race," I mean to include statements about every-
thing related to race, including issues like racism, the link between racism and poverty,
affirmative action, David Duke's racialist past and present, and attacks by members of
the Nation of Islam upon whites.
9. Robert Post has demonstrated the importance of public discourse to the functioning of a
democratic society. See generally Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public
Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103
HARV. L. REV. 601 (1990) [hereinafter, Post, Public Discourse]; Post, Free Speech, supra note 4,
See also Karst, supra note 4 (describing tradition of marginalized groups challenging orthodoxy
through uncivil language); Lawrence B. Solum, Freedom of Communicative Action: A Theory of
FirstAmendment Freedom of Speech, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 54 (1989).
10. See generally Matsuda, supra note 2.
11. See, e.g., Fried, supra 3, at 228 n.15; Richard Warner, Why Pragmatism? The
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gress is to be made in the conversation about race, at a minimum
those who oppose hate speech regulations generally must either
deny the existence of the harms so clearly articulated by Matsuda,
Lawrence, Delgado and other critical race theorists, or acknowledge
these harms and explain why they do not justify regulation.
If racist hate speech is "any expression of the idea that color
marks a person as suspect in morals or ability," 2 it is apparent that
such a definition ranges across a wide spectrum of speech: from rac-
ist vilification directed by skinheads at a black child, to disparaging
remarks about a co-worker; from racist diatribes by black national-
ists or Nazis carried on some cable stations, to off-the-cuff remarks
or "jokes" that reinforce racial stereotypes. The types of situations
grouped under the rubric "hate speech" range from serious harms to
problems of insensitivity, offensive speech and the breakdown of
civility rules. Although general discussions about hate speech have
helped us to understand some of the larger issues at stake, refocus-
ing the discussion on specific forms of hate speech may not only il-
luminate possible areas of agreement, but also narrow the class of
situations in which disagreement will persist. We might, for exam-
ple, distinguish racist threats of violence from speech that offends or
violates civility rules. First Amendment concerns with hate speech
regulations will most likely be minimized if one specifies which
forms of hate speech trigger concern and describes the category of
speech narrowly. One goal might be to target the particular forms of
hate speech that create some of the most serious harms13 while rec-
ognizing that for the conversation about race to continue, we will
have to suffer with outrageous speech and incivility here as in other
areas of life.' 4
Puzzling Place of Pragmatism in Critical Theory, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 535, 544.
The point made in the text has also been made by Charles R. Lawrence III and Fred-
erick Schauer. See Lawrence, If He Hollers, supra note 1, at 461; Frederick Schauer, The
Phenomenology of Speech and Harm, 103 ETHICS 635, 652 n.32 (1993).
Similarly, by ritually invoking "slippery slope" and "line drawing" arguments, one
side in the debate over campus speech codes seems oblivious to the fact that tremendous
speech regulation already takes place in an academic setting: faculty regulate classroom
discussions, evaluate papers, grade exams-presumably rewarding good speech and pe-
nalizing bad speech. Some on the other side have seemed unable or unwilling to articu-
late any limits to a totalizing theory of race-or gender-oppression, which would seem-
ingly justify extraordinary speech regulations. See, e.g., CATHERINE MACKINNON, ONLY
WORDS (1993). My point is not that these arguments are necessarily meritless in every
context, but that they oversimplify an intensely complicated problem.
12. Michelman, supra note 1, at 339 (defining racially stigmatizing speech). Matsuda
would permit regulation of hate speech where the message is of racial inferiority, and it is
persecutorial, hateful, degrading, and directed against an historically oppressed group.
Matsuda, supra note 2, at 2357. See infra text accompanying notes 200-03.
13. See Post, Free Speech, supra note 4, at 270.
14. As cogently pointed out by critical race theorists, however, members of minority
6571994]
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This, in any event, is the design of this Article. Rather than en-
gaging in abstract argument over the validity of hate speech regula-
tions, I propose to evaluate just one form of "hate speech": racially-
motivated threats of violence. In focusing the inquiry in this way, I
have chosen a subject in which, at least in theory, First Amendment
problems are less serious than in other areas.
Yet, despite the general assumption among scholars that regu-
lating threats of violence does not pose significant First Amendment
problems, a number of state courts and some federal courts have
struggled to define the limits of racially-motivated intimidation or
threats of violence. Many racial intimidation statutes have been
challenged, and some have foundered, on First Amendment
grounds. 5 These courts have encountered the theoretical and practi-
cal dilemmas raised by any proposal to regulate the content of
speech: first, how to distinguish a threat of violence from a non-
threat, such as vehement opposition to racial integration? And sec-
ond, how specifically must 6 a statute define the prohibitable con-
duct? The fact that language is malleable and contingent makes
highly problematic any effort to regulate speech harms, including
harms that stem from violent threats. The fact that speech centers
groups who are the subject of the national discussion about race may be more vulnerable
to those discussions. See, e.g., Lawrence, If He Hollers, supra note 1, at 459. This is the
dilemma to which this Article is addressed.
15. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993) (holding that penalty en-
hancement statute did not violate First Amendment); Richards v. State, 608 So. 2d 917
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (holding Florida's penalty enhancement statute void for vague-
ness), rev'd, 638 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 1994); Dobbins v. State, 605 So. 2d 922 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1992) (upholding constitutionality of Florida's penalty enhancement statute), affd, 631
So. 2d 303 (Fla. 1994); People v. Justice, No. 1-90-1793 (Mich. Dist. Ct. 1990) (holding
Iffichigan's ethnic intimidation statute unconstitutional on both vagueness and First
Amendment grounds); People v. Dupont, 486 N.Y.S.2d 169 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dept. 1985)
(voiding harassment penal statute for being impermissably vague and overbroad); People
v. Miccio, 589 N.Y.S.2d 762 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1992) (finding punishment enhancement stat-
ute constitutional); People v. Mulqueen, 589 N.Y.S.2d 246 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1992)
(sustaining New York Civil Rights anti-harassment against First Amendment challenge);
People v. Grupe, 532 N.Y.S.2d 815 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1988) (upholding New York's ethnic
intimidation statute against First Amendment and equal protection challenges); State v.
Wyant, 624 N.E.2d 722 (Ohio 1994) (sustaining Ethnic Intimidation Act against First
Amendment challenge); State v. Plowman, 838 P.2d 558 (Or. 1992) (upholding Oregon's
intimidation statute against vagueness and First Amendment challenges), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 2967 (1993); State v. Beebe, 680 P.2d 11 (Or. Ct. App. 1984) (invalidating Ore-
gon's ethnic intimidation statue on equal protection grounds), appeal denied, 683 P.2d
1372 (Or. 1984); State v. Talley, 858 P.2d 217 (Wash. 1993) (upholding Washington hate
crimes statute as neither regulating speech nor impermissibly vague). See also Johnson v.
Hugo's, 974 F.2d 1408 (4th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (examining evidence, under Virginia law,
which might suggest acts of harassment or intimidation).
16. Or "may"; see R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992); see discussion
infra part III.D.1.a.
17. The same words can have multiple dimensions and divergent if not conflicting
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our culture and helps us constitute our multiple communities makes
any proposal to regulate it politically charged. 8 The fact that at
least some "threats" can be spoken rhetorically, emotionally or in-
sincerely makes all threats, even threats of violence, potentially
protected by First Amendment principles. 9 The legal tools to sepa-
rate the protected from the unprotected must be attuned to wide di-
vergences in meaning.
Consequently, any attempt to answer the questions over which
courts have struggled must comport with underlying First Amend-
ment concerns. Regulating verbal threats is, after all, regulating the
content of expression.0 My approach to the questions posed in the
courts is to turn from the content of speech to the context in which a
given statement was rendered. I argue that it is only through an
exploration of such non-content-based factors as the setting in which
the communication occurs that we can begin to answer the troubling
questions.2'
A contextual inquiry entails examining background facts
against which words are uttered in an effort to infer the "meaning"
of the communication. Such factors might include the identities of
meanings. Consider, for example, three different "meanings" of a single racial slur: (1)
spoken by a white police officer to a person of color; (2) spoken by a member of the group
to which the slur purportedly refers to another "in group" member; or (3) incorporated
into a highly-publicized song of a performance group comprised of "in group" members.
Consider the "easy" case of threats of violence, which most people assume are clearly
outside First Amendment protections. In this regard, consider insincere, joking or emo-
tional threats: "I could just kill Henry for stepping on the daffodils!" How much "threat" is
enough to justify its prohibition may not be easily resolved. See, e.g., Watts v. United
States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
18. See Henry J. Hyde & George M. Fishman, The Collegiate Speech Protection Act
of 1991: A Response to the New Intolerance in the Academy, 37 WAYNE L. REV. 1469
(1991). The hate speech debate on campus has often triggered the criticism of those ob-
jecting to what they view as the out-of-hand sway of "political correctness." See, e.g., Ro-
nald J. Rychlak, Civil Rights, Confederate Flags and Political Correctness: Free Speech
and Race Relations on Campus, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1411 (1992); Suzanna Sherry, Speaking
of Virtue: A Republican Approach to University Regulation of Hate Speech, 75 MINN. L.
REV. 933 (1991); Nicholas Wolfson, Free Speech Theory and Hateful Words, 60 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1 (1991); Richard Bernstein, The Rising Hegemony of the Politically Correct, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 28, 1990, § 4, at 1; Chester E. Finn, The Campus: "An Island of Repression in
a Sea of Freedom," COMMENTARY, Sept. 1989; Watch What You Say-Thought Police:
There's a Politically Correct Way to Talk About Race, Sex and Ideas, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 24,
1990, at 48.
19. See, e.g., Watts v. United States, 394 U.S 705 (1969); State v. Harrington, 680
P.2d 666 (Or. Ct. App. 1984).
20. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2554 (1992) (holding that
regulation based on content of "fighting words" is subject to strict scrutiny).
21. A number of scholars have called for renewed attention to context in legal deci-
sionmaking. See, e.g., Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context, 63 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1597 (1990); Catherine Wells, Situated Decisionmaking, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1727
(1990). See also BEN-AIM SCHARFSTEIN, THE DILEMiA OF CONTEXT (1989).
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the speakers and listeners, the current and historical relationship
between the parties, the place in which the communication is made,
and the method or mode of communication. These factors are all
matters which affect, and sometimes control, the meaning of a par-
ticular speech act.
The contextual inquiry that I propose in order to decide
whether a given communication is a "threat" is analogous to prac-
tices in tort law. Practitioners of tort law decide whether someone
has committed a tortious act by examining the types of contextual
factors suggested above. In this Article I make the linkage explicit,
for tort law provides not only a tool to redress the harms represented
by racially-motivated threats of violence but also an appropriately
sensitive mechanism for weighing the competing interests at stake.
To illustrate these themes, and to situate the discussion in a
particular context, this Article proposes to make tortious a limited
class of hate speech-namely hate speech that threatens violence. I
make this concrete proposal both as a vehicle for exploring some of
the difficulties in remedying speech harms, and as an attempt to
remedy, in some small respect, the injuries inflicted by some of the
worst forms of hate speech. In making this proposal, I argue that,
regardless of the position one generally takes on the hate speech
controversy, most people would not object to making threats of racial
violence tortious. In deliberately side-stepping the passionate but
abstract debate over hate speech, I claim that it is not necessary to
take a position on the general issues raised by that debate in order
to agree with the position I advance in this Article. However, I also
believe that, by discussing the question of hate speech in this
particular context, threats of violence may help to illuminate some of
the key issues in the theoretical debate.
This Article consists of three parts. In Part I, I briefly discuss
why a verbal threat of violence is problematic. My approach is con-
sequentialist: I want to hone in on those types of threats that create
serious harms in the persons to whom they are directed and to dis-
tinguish the harms caused by threats of violence from other conse-
quences of language such as "offense." I conclude that threats of
violence are those that are strongly coercive or that demonstrably
inflict injury.
In Part H, I offer examples of what might be deemed "racially-
motivated threats of violence." My goal is to illustrate a contextual
approach to verbal threats and the hate speech debate generally. I
then present and evaluate possible First Amendment and policy-
based objections to a contextual methodology and its application to
communicative activity.
In Part I, I turn to tort law to give a concrete illustration of
how a contextual methodology might prove useful in formulating
[Vol. 42660
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strategies for addressing racially-motivated threats of violence. I
conclude that current tort law-which presents a potentially power-
ful mechanism for applying the contextual approach-provides in-
adequate remedies for this form of hate speech. I then present and
address First Amendment issues raised by a new tort of racial in-
timidation. The crux of the new tort would be the threat of violence
directed at a person because of race or ethnicity. My proposal would
make relevant certain contextual factors present in the racial threat
incidents but ignored under current tort law categories.
It is my hope that bringing tort law perspectives to bear on the
subject of hate speech will help illuminate and resolve some of the
knotty constitutional issues that surround the debate over regulat-
ing such speech. Although the proposed tort is limited in scope, it
illustrates an incremental, context-based approach to regulating
hate speech that takes into account some of the complexities of the
debate. Through tort law, where context is everything, we can im-
pose a narrow remedy consistent with both broad civil rights and
free speech principles.
I. WHAT'S WRONG WITH VERBAL THREATS OF VIOLENCE?
For most writers, criminalizing verbal threats of violence is not
constitutionally problematic. Robert Post writes that regulating
threats is "not problematic under any theory" of the First Amend-
ment.22 In Watts v. United States, the Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of the federal statute making it a crime to threaten the life
of the President.13 In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,2 4 Justice Scalia's
majority opinion assumed that "threats of violence'--including those
threats encompassed by the statute in Watts-were outside the
scope of First Amendment protectionY Justice White's concurrence
in R.AV., joined by the remaining three justices, also explicitly en-
dorsed the notion that verbal threats could be made the subject of*
prosecution without violating the First Amendment. 6 Thus, all
members of the current Court (except Justices Ginsburg and Breyer,
who have not had occasion to express an opinion) have agreed in
principle that threats of violence constitute unprotected speech.
Despite such authority, there are at least three reasons why it
may be helpful to question the assumption that verbal threats of
violence should not be constitutionally protected. First, if threats do.
not even trigger a First Amendment analysis, then we should un-
22. Post, Free Speech, supra note 4, at 306 n.187.
23. 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
24. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
25. Id. at 2546.
26. Id. at 2553-54 (White, J., concurring).
19941
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derstand why this is so.
Second, institutions of law must perform their sorting function,
and thus must know how to identify and distinguish such a "threat"
from a "non-threat." In addition, even if certain behaviors are de-
termined to be "threats" and therefore unprotected under the First
Amendment, "[wihat is a threat [of violence] must be distinguished
from what is constitutionally protected speech."27 Focusing on the
threat of violence requires that one attempt to define what consti-
tutes a "threat" sufficient to trigger the tort. Not all threats are cul-
pable. Only threats of harm are at issue here.
Third, it may turn out that when one looks at specific cases,
what constitutes a "threat" of violence may be as problematic as
other forms of content regulation. Thus, if it turns out that threats
are properly excluded from protected speech, then a richer under-
standing of "threat" may help form the justification for speech regu-
lations restricting verbal threats.28 An examination of the reasons
for omitting the category of "verbal threats of violence" from the
First Amendment may additionally illuminate the limits of the doc-
trine.
In this section I approach the issue of "what is a threat of vio-
lence" obliquely. First, I distinguish between speech that "offends" a
listener or violates civility norms and speech that, by virtue of its
threatening nature, can be said to "harm" the target of the threat.29
Second, I problematize the general concept of "threats of violence" by
showing that because the concept is not self-defining, any attempt to
regulate such threats depends upon social understandings and the
context in which these threats are made. In the following section, I
then explore examples of how such a contextualized approach to
regulating threats of racial violence might work.
A. Offense and Harm
The fact that words are used, by hypothesis, in issuing verbal
threats of violence should give anyone interested in the First
Amendment pause. Still, this fact does not mean that the govern-
ment may not sanction the threat. 0 To clarify why the government
27. Watts, 394 U.S. at 707.
28. There is a rich philosophical literature on the concept of "threat," a full discus-
sion of which is beyond the scope of this Article. See, e.g., JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO
OTHERS (1984); ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION (1987); Ken Simons, Offers, Threats, and
Unconstitutional Conditions, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 289 (1989).
29. For convenience, throughout this Article I use the terminology of oral communi-
cations, but I assume that there are many circumstances in which non-oral communica-
tions could constitute a "threat." Such non-oral communications might include flag-wav-
ing or the "calling card" of the Klan.
30. Akhil Amar, Comment, The Case of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of
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has a compelling interest in punishing threats of violence, it is nec-
essary to distinguish between speech that causes definable harms
and speech that merely "offends."
In R.AV., Justice Scalia gave three reasons why "threats of
violence are outside the First Amendment."31 The state's interests
include "protecting individuals (1) from the fear of violence, (2) from
the disruption that fear engenders, and (3) from the possibility that
the threatened violence will occur."32 To these three concerns I add
two others that apply with special force to racially-motivated threats
of violence: that such threats (4) will deprive some members of a
community the opportunity to participate equally in the functioning
of society,3 3 and (5) "will have an insidious effect on social relations"
among racial groups in the society.' Many of these general harms
are reflected in the incidents described in the next section.
The fear that threats of violence create in their auditors can be
great. The fear may stem from the realization that one is vulnerable
to great harm, or from the sense that it may not be possible to walk
around or live in certain neighborhoods without incurring signifi-
cant risk of harm.35 It is also frequently difficult-particularly with
anonymous threats-to determine the likelihood that the speaker
will attempt to carry out the threat. The resulting uncertainty, cou-
pled with the knowledge that one cannot protect oneself at all times,
can lead to extreme stress.
This fear and stress, in turn, can cause targets of threats to
change their patterns of living. Instead of taking a walk to the park,
one might go to a gym. The simple act of moving into a largely white
St. Paul, 106 HARV. L. REV. 124 (1992).
31. 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2546 (1992). -
32. Id.
33. Michelnan, supra note 1, at 343.
34. KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 143 (1989)
[hereinafter GREENAWALT, USES OF LANGUAGE].
35. A quick review of significant cases in the federal courts reveals just a small pro-
portion of the cases involving threats of racial violence and illustrates some of the effects
on the victims. See, e.g., R.AV. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992); United States v.
Lee, 6 F.3d 1297 (8th Cir. 1993) (cross-burning), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1550 (1994); U.S.
v. McAninch, 994 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir. 1993) (defendant sent article describing death of
Ethiopian youth, oath pledging allegiance to KKK, and photograph of confederate statue
with swastika to couples believed to be interracial), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 394 (1993);
U.S. v. Skillman, 922 F.2d 1370 (9th Cir. 1990) (cross-burning), cert. dismissed, 112 S. Ct.
353 (1991); United States v. Gilbert, 813 F.2d 1523 (9th Cir. 1987) (flyers threatening
death, threats with car, and spitting), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 860 (1987), appeal after re-
mand, 884 F.2d 454 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1082 (1990); United States v.
Redwine, 715 F.2d 315 (7th Cir. 1983) (threats of burnings, racial epithets, throwing
rocks and bottles), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1216 (1984); Evans v. Tubbe, 657 F.2d 661 (5th
Cir. 1981) (racial epithets, blocked access to newly purchased home).
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neighborhood can trigger threats, harassment and other violence. 6
The fear of racial threats and violence is regarded as a significant
reason why African Americans are reluctant to enter white neigh-
borhoods."7 Instead of exposing oneself to the public, one might be
inclined to hide out in "safe" places. But, then, what is a safe place?
If the threat is communicated over the phone, or at one's home, it
may seem that no place is safe. Threats of violence thus coerce by
significantly disrupting one's entire sense of security.
The third of the R.A.V. interests-preventing the threats from
actually being carried out-is also important. The victim certainly
has a strong interest in preventing the threatened violence from oc-
curring, and the state has a similarly compelling interest in fore-
stalling violence.
The final two interests relate to the state's justifications for
singling out racially-motivated threats of violence for special pro-
hibition. The fourth interest is that threats of violence may prevent
36. States that collect data on the location of hate crimes report that most hate
crimes occur at the residence of the victim. See ASSOCIATION OF STATE UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTING PROGRAMS & CENTER FOR APPLIED SOCIAL RESEARCH, NORTHEASTERN
UNIVERSITY, HATE CRIME STATISTICS, 1990: A RESOURCE BOOK 6 (1992). In 1991, of 4,558
bias-motivated offenses reported to the FBI, 1,614 involved incidents of intimidation.
Hate Crime Data, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., Mar. 1993, at 4; Brief for the Crown
Heights Coalition et al. as Amici Curiae, at 1A-7A, Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194,
2198 n.4 (1993). The data in the FBI report is supplied by law enforcement agencies in
thirty-two states and is the first available from the FBI's statistical program on hate
crimes. The program is implemented by law enforcement agencies across the nation and
was initiated in response to the Hate Crimes Statistics Act of 1990, which directs the At-
torney General to collect data "about crimes that manifest evidence of prejudice based on
race, religion, sexual orientation, or ethnicity." Id. The reported figures are based on in-
formation provided on a voluntary basis from law enforcement agencies. Only 2,771
agencies took part in the effort, which falls far short of the 16,000 police agencies that
provide information to the FBI for its Uniform Crime Reports. See Hate Crimes; First.
time FBIReport Reveals Prevalence of Malice, HOUSTON CHRON., Jan. 11, 1993, at A12. In
the 1992 study, 6,180 law enforcement agencies in 41 states reported, though, according
to Harper Wilson of the FBI, this study "only covers half of the population." The report
counted 8,075 hate crimes. Broken down by race, 2,882 (36 percent) of the crimes were
against blacks and 1,664 (21 percent) were against whites. The type of hate crime most
frequently reported was intimidation by physical threat. Paul Leavitt et al., Hate-Crime
Report: Blacks Targeted Most, USA TODAY, Mar. 7, 1994, at 3A.
37. See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEG-
REGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 232 (1993); Reynolds Farley et al., Barri-
ers to the Racial Integration of Neighborhoods: The Detroit Case, 441 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. Sol. 97 (1979); James E. Rosenbaum et al., Can the Kerner Commission's
Housing Strategy Improve Employment, Education, and Social Integration for Low-In-
come Blacks? 71 N.C. L. REV. 1519, 1526 (1993).
The FBI reported that during 1991, 4,558 bias-motivated offenses were committed.
These included 1,614 incidents of intimidation, 1,301 incidents of vandalism, 796 simple
assaults, 773 aggravated assaults, and 12 murders. Hate Crime Data, FBI L. EN-
FORCEMENT BULL., Mar. 1993, at 5; see also Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2198 n.4.
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minority members from equal participation in the life of a commu-
nity. This may occur for several reasons. The most obvious is that a
threat may discourage victims from exposing themselves to com-
munity life. In addition, racially-motivated threats are stigmatizing
on account of their association with racial subordination.
Stigmatization is "the process by which the dominant group in
society differentiates itself from others by setting them apart,
treating them as less than fully human, denying them acceptance by
the organized community, and excluding them from participating in
that community as equals."38 Stigmatization results from the impo-
sition of a label that defines the marked person as deviant, flawed
and undesirable. The stigma is discrediting because it is connected
to purportedly deviant dispositions. The discredited characteristics
become more significant when the deviant dispositions are seen as
enduring and primary and thus part of the stigmatized person's
identity. If the target is significantly stigmatized, the stigmatizer
becomes incapable of dealing with the target apart from the as-
sumption that the deviant mark is an essential part of the target's
identity. 9 Thus, persons belonging to a stigmatized group are ex-
pected to display the behavior stereotypical of that group.40 Labeling
someone as a member of a stigmatized group ultimately serves as
the basis for devaluing that person and contributes to that person's
negative perception by the entire community.
The badge or symbol which the victim is forced to wear derives
its humiliating meaning from historical, societal and cultural con-
texts, as well as from the way witnesses interpret it. 4 ' Stigma is not
an inherent attribute; rather, people are labeled within the context
of a particular culture and historical events.42 Racially-motivated
threats of violence single out racial groups and imprint them with
badges of inferiority. Such threats infect society generally. They fal-
sify the legal ideal of equality and deny the importance of respect for
individuals. Because the racial stigmatization that accompanies ra-
cially-motivated threats of violence obstructs members of racial mi-
norities from participating equally in community life, the state has a
38. Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection, supra note 2, at 350; see also
Kenneth L. Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 GA. L. REV. 245, 248-49 (1983) (citing
ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 1-9 (1963)).
39. See EDWARD E. JONES ET AL., SOCIAL STIGMA: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MARKED
RELATIONSHIPS 6-9 (1984).
40. See EDWIN H. PFUHL & STUART HENRY, THE DEVIANCE PROCESS 157-60 (3d. ed.
1993).
41. See Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection, supra note 2, at 351.
42. See THE DILEMMA OF DIFFERENCE: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY VIEW OF STIGMA 4
(Stephen C. Ainlay et al., eds., 1986).
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special interest in prohibiting them.43
The final interest justifying regulation of racially-motivated
threats of violence-preventing the insidious effects of racially-moti-
vated threats of violence on inter-group race relations-depends for
its strength on two factors. The first factor is the extent to which the
implicated racial communities are heterogenous. If a given racial
community is isolated from other races, then a racial threat may
greatly affect that group's perception of the racial community from
which the threat issues.
The second factor affecting the impact on race relations is how
"public" the threat was or becomes. If the threat is known only to a
small group of people, it may have a modest effect on race relations
in the society. If a communication is widely known, however, the ef-
fect may be dramatic. Consider the effect on race relations stemming
from the repeated broadcast of the videotape of the Los Angeles po-
lice officers beating Rodney King. Many African-Americans had
heard about racist comments made by police officers ("gorillas in the
mist") and saw the link between the racist expression and the blows
from the officers' batons.44 Both of these factors affect the
"credibility" of a threat. When a white person threatens an African-
American with violence, the threat is often viewed as presumptively
credible due to the history of violence by whites against blacks in
this country, as well as the persistence of segregation in daily life.45
But because racially-motivated threats of violence are racially
stigmatizing, they also impede the development of relationships
between victim groups and members of other races.46 Racial threats
signal to members of other races the individual's inferior status, in-
dicating that the victim is a pariah and diminishing the respect
given to the victim's racial group.4 7
Members of majority groups may simultaneously feel relief that
they are not victimized by such attacks and fear that they will be
victimized if seen as racial minority sympathizers.48 Those who as-
sociate with stigmatized persons experience "courtesy stigma" by
43. See Richard Delgado, Words that Wound- A Tort Action for Racial Insults,
Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 137 (1982) [hereinafter Del-
gado, Words That Wound].
44. Ralph M. Semien, In Today's America, Justice is Still Deferred, L.A. TIMES, Au-
gust 6, 1993, at B7; see also Paul Hoffman, Double Jeopardy Wars: The Case for a Civil
Rights 'Exception," 41 UCLA L. REV. 649, 685 (1994); Laurie L. Levenson, Change of
Venue and the Role of the Criminal Jury, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1533, 1567-58 (1993).
45. See, e.g., MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 37, at 97.
46. See Delgado, Words That Wound, supra note 43, at 142.
47. See Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection, supra note 2, at 351.
48. See Susan Gelman, Sticks and Stones Can Put You In Jail, But Can Words In-
crease Your Sentence? Constitutional and Policy Dilemmas of Ethnic Intimidation Laws,
30 UCLA L. REV. 333, 342 (1991); see also Matsuda, supra note 2, at 2338-39.
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sharing the disdain shown to the stigmatized individual.49 Racial
stigmatization also destroys the victim's ability to behave neutrally
with members of other races. Stigma impacts even the victim's rela-
tions with members of the same racial group.50 Ultimately, victims
may reject their own identity as members of a racial minority
group.6 ' In sum, because racially-motivated threats of violence dis-
rupt social relations among racial groups, the state has a strong in-
terest in controlling such threats.
For purposes of First Amendment analysis, speech that causes
the five types of harm described above must be distinguished from
speech that is "offensive" or speech that violates civility rules ad-
dressing how people should speak to each other.5 2 By "offensive"
speech I mean language, public displays or discomforts associated
with communication that triggers an unpleasant emotional response
in at least some listeners and that steps over the bounds of per-
ceived good taste. It is possible to define "offensive communications"
to include insults, epithets,5  salty language,- George Carlin's
"seven dirty words,"55 sex talk on the airwaves, 6 commercial adver-
tisements that use scantily-clad women to sell beer to men or car-
49. See PFPUHL & HENRY, supra note 40, at 157-60, 178.
50. See Delgado, Words that Wound, supra note 43, at 137.
51. See Matsuda, supra note 2, at 2337 & n.87; see also Gelman, supra note 48, at
341.
52. On civility rules and the First Amendment, see Post, Free Speech, supra note 4,
at 285-88. A number of commentators have not distinguished between speech that merely.
causes offense and speech that causes legally cognizable harm. See, e.g., Lauri A. Ebel,
University Anti-Discrimination Codes v. Free Speech, 23 N.M. L. REV. 169 (1993); Thomas"
L. McAllister, Rules and Rights Colliding: Speech Codes and the First Amendment on
College Campuses, 59 TENN. L. REV. 409 (1992); Cary Nelson, Symposium on Race Con-
sciousness and Legal Scholarship: Hate Speech and Political Correctness, 1992 U. ILL. L.-
REV. 1085; Evan G.S. Siegel, Comment, Closing the Campus Gates to Free Expression:
The Regulation of Offensive Speech at Colleges and Universities, 39 EMORY L.J. 1351
(1990).
53. See Greenawalt, Insults and Epithets, supra note 1 (arguing that regulating in-
sults such as "you stupid bastard" or epithets such as "wop" on the basis of their general:
offensiveness may be sound in some narrow settings).
54. See Gonzalez v. Comm'n on Judicial Performance, 657 P.2d 372 (Cal. 1983)
(holding that "salty" courtroom comments consisting of blatant ethnic slurs allegedly
made in jest are apt to offend minority members and are sanctionable as wilful miscon-
duct).
55. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (affirming restriction of broad-
cast containing indecent language).
56. See In re Infinity Broadcasting Corp. of Pennsylvania, 2 FCC Red. 2705 (1987)
(holding portions of explicitly sexual Howard Stern talk show actionable). But see Lili
Levi, The Hard Case of Broadcast Indecency, 20 N.Y.U. REV. OF LAW & SOC. CHANGE 49
(1993) (advocating deregulation of broadcast indecency in light of the dangers of FCC
regulation of any "[s]exual... reference that the 'average' broadcast viewer or listener
would find 'patently offensive' ").
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toonish camels to sell tobacco to children,57 disgusting "parodies" of
public figures like Jerry Falwell,5 playboy pinups on workplace
walls,59 public displays of nudity,0 street harassment of women, 61
Louis Farrakhan's diatribes against Jews or whites,62 and Nazi
marches through Skokie. It is also possible to use the term
"offensive" to describe speech that is vicious, demeaning, personally-
directed and racist, and that terrorizes the auditor. "Offensive
speech," therefore, can be seen as an overarching category of lan-
guage that includes swearing, insults, and derogatory advertise-
ments as well as intimidating, threatening or harassing speech.
Although some have apparently used the concept of "offensive
speech" to describe all of the above types of speech, there is a dis-
tinction between speech that offends or violates civility norms and
speech that harms in certain specifically-defined ways. Speech that
harms must do more than trigger an adverse emotional reaction in a
listener." There is no constitutional value in libel,65 for instance, be-
57. See Bikini Ad Prompts a Sexual Harassment Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1991, at
L11 (describing suit by five female workers claiming that Stroh brewery created an en-
vironment tolerant of harassment by permitting suggestive graffiti and calendar photos of
nude women in the workplace); Shari Roan, All Fired Up: Critics Call Tobacco Industry's
Anti-Cigarette Messages for Teens Inappropriate, Misleading, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1992,
at El (reporting anti-smoking advocates' accusation that tobacco industry devised adver-
tisement strategies such as R.J. Reynolds' Joe Camel cartoon character to appeal to chil-
dren).
58. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (holding that public figures
cannot recover damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress claim unless it is
shown 'the publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with 'actual
malice' ").
59. See Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991)
(holding that sexually explicit pictures "are not protected speech because they act as dis-
criminatory conduct in the form of a hostile work environment").
60. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (holding that although
offensive to many people, nude dancing contains expression protected by the First
Amendment).
61. Cynthia Grant Bowman, Street Harassment and the Informal Ghettoization of
Women, 106 HARV. L. REV. 517 (1993).
62. See Don Terry, Farrakhan: Fiery Separatist in a Sober Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2,
1994, at A2 (reporting that Farrakhan has "attracted attention" for attacks against
whites and Jews).
63. See Colin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1108 (7th Cir. 1978) (holding that trauma likely to
be created by Nazi march in Skokie, Illinois, home to large numbers of holocaust survi-
vors, inadequate to support prohibition of parade).
64. See Goldberger, supra note 3.
65. In New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the Court held that under
certain circumstances libelous utterances would be protected under the First Amend-
ment. The Court has pointed out, however, that it offers such protection not because
there is constitutional value in libel per se, but because some libelous utterances (against,
for example, public officials and public figures) must be permitted to allow "breathing
room" for free-flowing discussions and debate on public issues. Id. at 271.
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cause libel harms the reputations of individuals in a way that makes
it difficult for them to function in society.66 Libel not only "offends,"
but also harms, the person about whom the libel is disseminated.
The harms can include damage to a person's standing in the com-
munity, potential ridicule or humiliation, which may make it diffi-
cult to work or to carry on other activities.
Similarly, incitement to illegal action creates the danger that
speech directed toward producing imminent, unlawful action may in
fact produce such action, and therefore such speech can be regulated
because of the serious risk of harm. It is irrelevant whether or not
the speech offends; all that matters is the likelihood that the harm
of imminent lawlessness will result.6
Turning now to threats of racial violence, the harms to which
Justice Scalia referred in R.V. come into clear relief.69 Threats of
violence may offend or transgress civility norms, but they do much
more; they can cause people endless worry about their physical
safety and lead them to alter their lifestyles in order to avoid the
possible consequences. Racially-motivated threats can also disrupt
the goal of achieving a racially-diverse, peaceful society, in which
racial conflicts are resolved without violence. These are harms that
go beyond an adverse emotional reaction.
Still, the fact that threats of violence cause harm rather than
mere offense does not show conclusively why they, and not other
kinds of speech, are outside the First Amendment. Many types of
speech said to cause "harm" are nevertheless protected, e.g., the
parody in Hustler.70 All censors justify regulation under a harm
principle. Moreover, even some threats of violence have been held
entitled to protection.7' The crucial question is why should this harm
in this particular instance warrant regulation?
66. See, e.g., Seth Goodchild, Note, Media Counteractions: Restoring the Balance to
Modern Libel Law, 75 GEO. L.J. 315, 317-18 n.18 (1986) (observing that "words that
tended to expose one to public hatred, shame, obloquy, ridicule or contempt, or words that
impaired one's standing in the community were considered defamatory").
67. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), the Supreme Court held that
in order to recover, private persons who are defamed about matters of public concern
must show actual injury, including "impairment of reputation and standing in the com-
munity, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering." Id. at 350. Rodney
Smolla observes that libel actions serve to provide legal redress for both harm to reputa-
tion and psychological injury. Rodney A. Smolla, Let the Author Beware: The Rejuvenation
of the American Law of Libel, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 18 (1983).
68. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
69. See discussion infra part III.D.1.a.
70. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988); see supra note 58 and accom-
panying text.
71. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
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B. Problematizing Threats of Violence
Suppose you are a bank teller and someone hands you a note
that says "I have a gun. Give me your money. If you trigger the
alarm I will kill you." That note is "speech"; it communicates an idea
in the form of a threat of violence to you. Unless you are incredibly
courageous-or stupid-it also keeps you from speaking. There is no
dialogue and no opportunity for discussion. There is no more com-
munication. Now, suppose a government agent proposes to punish
the speaker through either arrest and prosecution or allowing you to
file a tort action. This is state action in that the agent is using the
power of the state to protect you from the power of the speaker.
But what if the speaker now claims that the government is in-
terfering with his First Amendment right of speech? A court faced
with such a claim would have to decide two questions: First, is the
threat "speech" within the meaning of the First Amendment?" The
petitioner can point to decisions describing writings as "speech"
protected under the First Amendment, and argue that if he is pun-
ished for these words, he is being punished for "speaking." And he
would be right; if the speaker is punished, we are punishing him for
the content of his communication. In order to punish the threat, you
need to know what was said-that is, one needs to understand the
content of the communication."
The second question then arises: If the threatening note consti-
tutes "speech," does the state have a sufficiently strong interest in
its regulation? In order to answer this question, a court must have a
theory of what purposes are served by the First Amendment. This
theory will help the court determine whether to allow government
regulation at all, and if so, how strong the government's interest
must be to justify the regulation.
If the purpose of the First Amendment is simply to prevent the
government from interfering with the speaker, the regulator loses. 4
But that principle has never been the primary focus of First
Amendment theory. The Court has at times rightly been concerned
with limiting the government's power to censor, but limiting gov-
ernment has operated, at most, as a background idea rather than a
compelling First Amendment principle. The reason for this is clear:
72. See Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three
Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265 (1981).
73. Some might try to label this event "conduct," not "speech," and thus escape the
First Amendment problem. However, it seems pointless to manipulate the speech-conduct
distinction in this way without explaining why one speech act falls under the "speech"
prong, and another the "conduct" prong. For one effort to grapple with this set of prob-
lems, using speech act theory, see GREENAWALT, USES OF LANGUAGE, supra note 34. For a
description of the classification problem, see Schauer, supra note 72.
74. See Fried, supra note 3.
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if limiting government were the primary concern, the First Amend-
ment would impose a barrier to many significant governmental
regulations of "private" behavior, particularly in the economic
sphere. Much government speech regulation bars one economically-
powerful party from committing fraud, blackmail and false advertis-
ing, and from lying in commercial affairs.
75
Although the court must decide whether the spoken words are
"speech" and, if so, whether the state may regulate them given the
strength of the state's interest, my example has obscured a third and
most central question to be decided: Do the spoken words, in context,
constitute a "threat"? The bank teller receives a sufficiently coercive
message that most people would assume is a regulable threat. But,
suppose there is no gun, and the speaker says he was joking?76 We
might decide that what counts in this circumstance is the perspec-
tive of the listener, i.e., the object of the threat.
This was the approach taken by the court in Allen v. Hanna-
ford,7" a tort action for assault. The defendant in Allen, because of a
gun-pointing incident, claimed that the fact that the gun was un-
loaded deprived the tort of the essential element of imminence. The
court held that the plaintiffs perspective counted, and since the
plaintiff had no way of knowing the gun was not loaded, the defen-
dant's present inability to carry out her threat of violence was not
controlling.
78
Although one who carries an empty gun may still assault an-
other, we can conceive of a "threat" that really is not a threat at all.
Suppose the words "if you trigger the alarm I will kill you" are spo-
ken by a small child who clearly does not have access to a gun. At
some point on the decisional spectrum the words in context will not
amount to a regulable threat. Some language which sounds like a
threat cannot be regulated because, in context, it is clear that the
language is not, in fact, threatening. What distinguishes a regulable
threat from "free speech" within this contextual inquiry is the sub-
ject of the next section.
II. SPECIFICITY AND CONTEXT
This section serves dual purposes: First, it gives content to the
notion of racial threats of violence through an exploration of particu-
75. See generally GREENAWALT, USES OF LANGUAGE, supra note 34.
76. Events such as this have reportedly occurred at airport security checks.
77. 244 P. 700 (Wash. 1926).
78. Id. at 701; see also Lowry v. Standard Oil Co., 146 P.2d 57, 60 (Cal. Ct. App.
1944) (stating that "[tihe pointing of a gun at another in a threatening manner is suffi-
cient to cause fear of personal injury unless it is known by the person at whom the
weapon is pointed that the gun is in fact unloaded").
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lar incidents; and second, it exemplifies a contextual methodology,
some form of which is necessitated by any attempt to regulate the
content of hateful expressions." By choice of example, I give cre-
dence to the arguments of proponents of hate speech regulation that
racially-motivated threats of violence are a means of depriving peo-
ple of color of fundamental civil rights.
A. Introduction To A Contextual Methodology For Hate Speech
It may be helpful at the outset to describe what I mean by
"meaning" and "context," and to acknowledge the limited nature of
this project. First, by using the term "meaning," I intend to state
only that, within contemporary American legal culture, one can de-
scribe an interpretation of a given speech act which for many people
"rings true." If you nearly bump into a stranger while walking on the
street, and he yells "fuck you!" at you, I claim only that most people
will interpret the yelled words as an insult. I do not argue that there
is only one "meaning" of a given speech act, and, given the plasticity
of language, such a claim would seem difficult to make."
Second, by "context," I mean relevant background facts which,
when aligned with the literal words, help us to make sense of lan-
guage.-' I want to situate words in a place and a time, and to know
something about the speaker as well as the auditor. Some examples
of contextual factors include: the identities of the speakers and lis-
teners, the intent of the speaker, the current and historical relation-
ship between the parties, the relationships between the "groups" to
which each of the parties belongs (or with which each party wishes
to identify herself), the place in which the communication is made,
the method or mode of communication, and the historical setting in
which the communication occurs. These factors are all matters
which affect (and sometimes control) the meaning of a particular
speech act.2
But, what is true of "meaning" is also true of "context": there is
no one set of contextual "factors" that is relevant in every setting
and whose description will tell us what certain words "mean." One
cannot establish the definitive set of criteria of contextual factors for
79. This methodology is necessary, I argue, because the "meaning" of what is often
termed "hate speech" can only be understood in context.
80. See generally PAUL CHEVIGNY, MORE SPEECH: DIALOGUE RIGHTS AND MODERN
LIBERTY (1988).
81. See generally Minow & Spelman, supra note 21.
82. There is a substantial and complex literature on meaning and language, an ex-
ploration of which is beyond the scope of this Article. See, e.g., ELEANOR ROSCH, COG-
NITION AND CATEGORIZATION (1978); FRANCIsCO J. VARELA, THE EMBODIED MIND:
COGNITIVE SCIENCE AND HUMAN EXPERIENCE (1991). See also PAUL CHEVIGNY, supra note
80, at 27-72.
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the same reason that one cannot definitively establish the meaning
of words without knowing more: languages and contexts are too di-
verse and malleable. Thus, the factors I have set forth are not part of
an unarticulated theory of relevance, although I am clearly operat-
ing within a paradigm in which I assume there is a limit to what
factors could be pertinent to "context." For example, I would assume
that the fact the man you nearly bump in the above example is
wearing red shoes would generally be less relevant to understanding
the meaning of his shouted communication than the fact that he is
on crutches. I could, however, imagine a situation (for example, if
the man were dressed like a clown and wore large floppy red shoes)
in which the color of someone's shoes might indeed be pertinent to
the meaning of shouted words. Consequently, I intend not to con-
struct a new formalism around "context," but to argue for a relevant,
appropriate interpretation of language within a given context.
An example of the type of contextual analysis that is necessary
to decide whether speech in a given setting is or is not a threat is
contained in Watts v. United States.83 Watts involved the interpreta-
tion of the statute making it a crime to threaten the life of the Presi-
dent. After a public rally against the Vietnam War, a demonstrator
was convicted of making a "threat" against the life of the President
when he said, "They always holler at us to get an education. I have
already received my draft classification as 1-A and I have got to re-
port for my physical this Monday coming. I am not going. If they
ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is
L.B.J.... They are not going to make me kill my black brothers."
The Supreme Court reversed Watts' conviction, holding that his only
offense was a "kind of very crude offensive method of stating a po-
litical opposition to the President.""' Taking the statement in con-
text, which included the fact the statement was made in argument
against someone who said the gathered youth should get more edu-
cation before expressing their views, and the fact the onlookers all
laughed after the petitioner's statement, the Court concluded that
the statement could not reasonably be taken to represent a threat
within the meaning of the statute.86
83. 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
84. Id. at 706.
85. Id. at 708.
86. Id. The Supreme Court has also recognized the validity of such a contextual ap-
proach in other circumstances. For example, in deciding whether a series of incidents
constituted sexual harassment under Title VII, the Court recently announced that lower
courts must balance a variety of factors:
whether an environment is "hostile" or "abusive" can be determined only by
looking at all the circumstances. These may include the frequency of the dis-
criminatory conduct; its severity, whether it is physically threatening or hu-
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B. The Context of Racial Threats of Violence
In order to evaluate its application and effectiveness, it may be
useful to see how a contextual approach would work in several cases
that raise the question: Has someone been the victim of a threat of
racial (or ethnic, or homophobic) violence? We now turn to examine
the concept of racial threats in specific circumstances.
Incident 1: Albert Nettles is a young black man who grew up in a rural
part of North Carolina. Hired into his first real job at age 21, he finds that
he is the only worker of color. During his short employment, several of the
white employees verbally taunt him and use racist terms when speaking
about him to other whites on the job. One of the employees tells Nettles
that he is a member of the Klan. Nettles leaves work another day to find
his tires slashed. After three weeks, he is fired. Nettles overhears his co-
workers using racist terms; and sometimes the white workers use the
terms to his face. The job site is located in a rural community in North
Carolina.87
Does the behavior of the white workers constitute a threat? It seems
to me that one cannot begin to answer this question without
evaluating in turn the meaning of several key facts.
First, what is the significance of the fact that Nettles is of a dif-
ferent race than the other workers? This fact means that Nettles is
isolated racially from the others. The categories of "race" and "race
difference" have substantial meaning in contemporary culture. One
cannot deny that to be isolated racially on a job site places one in a
vulnerable position. At least as to speech involving racial matters,
the racially-isolated interlocutor is exposed to the risk of harm in a
way that the others are not.
Second, what is the significance of the fact that Nettles is black
and the other workers are white (as opposed to simply being of a dif-
ferent race)? The answer, again, depends on the peculiar American
dilemma of race and racial difference. Here the white workers feel
safe in uttering their obscenities. They have no fear that the black
worker will have allies among their number that would make them
equally vulnerable. Moreover, even if the black worker did have an
ally, the prevalence among whites of spoken racial stereotypes about
blacks makes it much less likely that the white racist will be chal-
lenged in a manner that would risk violence to the speaker. Among
white males one can use a racial epithet about nonwhites with im-
miliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes
with an employee's work performance.
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 371 (1993). Such an approach, involving
"looking at all the circumstances," is also necessary if one is attempting to evaluate the
content of communication.
87. I served as counsel to Mr. Nettles. Albert Nettles is a pseudonym.
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punity. At worst, one risks a reprimand. But, though exposed as a
racist, one instills in his fellows the idea that he is tough, a man.
Third, does the nature of the job and place make any difference
in the meaning of the communication? Here, the jobsite-a con-
struction site-is a place where, in the popular mythology of work,
men (and I do mean men) can work out and express their baser in-
stincts without the intermediating influences of women or office ci-
vilities. The work is outdoors, where verbal exchanges are less for-
mal and the expectation of civility is less. Those who do not fit the
mode of the hard-hatted worker can expect to be ridiculed.
It is also important that the language was spoken in a work-
place. People are not as free to walk away from jobs as they are to
walk away from an harasser on a street corner. The workplace is a
place where, in our society, people are obliged to attend in order to
survive. It is not "optional" in the sense that attending functions at a
club or a bar can in some senses be described as "optional."
I do not rely here on the related idea, advanced by some, that
the fact the jobsite is subject to antidiscrimination rules differenti-
ates the speech from speech made outside the workplace. The
meaning of a communication does not change simply because the
state has chosen to regulate certain kinds of speech-for example,
sexually harassing speech-in the workplace. My point is that the
fact the statements to Nettles were made in an inherently coercive
environment affects the meaning of the communication, not that the
workplace is prima facie a regulable environment. It may be true
that the government has a greater interest in regulating speech in
the workplace (under, for example, captive audience rationales,88 or
as an economic regulation of the employment relationship), but the
mere fact of regulation does not independently affect the meaning of
the utterance. I will address the issue of the strength of the govern-
ment's regulatory interests below.
The method or mode of communication in this first incident
was, except for the tire slashing, all verbal. No one touched Nettles
or engaged in physically-threatening gestures such as fistshaking.
The fact that his car tires were anonymously slashed, however, puts
Nettles in a difficult position. Was he to assume that one of his fel-
low workers slashed his tires when his back was turned? Why would
anyone slash his tires and no one else's if he was not being singled
out by somebody for intimidation? The workplace was not in an area
he knew, and it would be impossible to determine whether he and
his car were subject to "random violence," violence by a friend of a
co-worker or by a co-worker. Significantly, however, his co-workers
88. See generally Marcy Strauss, Redefining the Captive Audience Doctrine, 19
HASTINGS CoNsT. L.Q. 85 (1991).
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simply laughed when he told them about the tire slashing.
Thus far, I have been examining the incident without regard to
the content of what was said to Nettles. I will shortly focus on the
"content" of the speech, but I want to emphasize that "what the spo-
ken words mean" depends to a significant extent on the context in
which they were spoken. That Nettles was the only black worker
among whites, that the jobsite was rural and isolated and "male,"
that Nettles was young and trying hard to succeed at his first job,
and that the site was located in a southern state where whites re-
sisted integration, all gave him a sense of isolation and vulnerabil-
ity. These facts made the words spoken to him much more signific-
ant-and powerful.
The nature of the speech to Nettles is also threatening-as any
black male in the South would find it to be. One does not have to
have one's tires slashed to feel the lash of the racial slur spat by a
white male at a black male in the presence of other white males who
do not protest. The sting of the implied threat remains long after the
speech is uttered. If Nettles is looked on as subhuman, will he rise to
greet the new day? If a co-worker says he is a Klansman, who is
Nettles to question his sincerity? Should he "kid" back: "you're not
really a Klansman, you turkey"? Not unless he wants to set in mo-
tion forces he cannot control. He knows what the Klan did without
ever reading about the Klan in history books. He knows the history
that anyone who today claims to be a member of the Klan is invok-
ing. He knows he is in danger without the Klansman writing his
name on a burning cross.
In short, the meaning of the "spoken words" depends on con-
text. Words spoken in the context of Nettles' history, the Klansmen's
history, the history of the South, the history of slavery and the
badges and servitudes that was Jim Crow (all enforced by the sear-
ing flames of the Klan's crosses)-these words mean nothing if not
in context. Nettles knows about Brown v. Board of Education,89 even
if he never heard of the case. He knows that whites protested, and
he knows that his state set the cornerstone of massive resistance9° to
integration. He knows about exclusion and segregation and what
happens to blacks if they stray too far from their neighborhood-
America's equivalent of a South African homeland. One word, care-
fully chosen by his co-worker, lectures Nettles' brain for hours about
where he should spend his days if he wants to preserve his sanity,
not to mention his life. He wants a job, but from this place he is ex-
cluded and silenced. If you do not understand the context in which
89. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
90. See Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV.
61 (1988).
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these words were spoken, you do not understand what was un-
derstood by the co-w6rker and by Nettles.
We can now begin to answer the question: Did the white work-
ers, or some of them, "threaten" Albert Nettles? My conclusion,
which by now is self-evident, is that the white workers did threaten
Nettles in a manner which he could reasonably take to encompass
violence against him. The reasons for this conclusion are contained
in the details of the facts and circumstances surrounding the com-
munications. The meaning of the words depends upon understand-
ing Nettles' vulnerability in relation to the white workers' position of
security.
Incident 2: Phillip and Renee Smith, a mixed race couple, agreed to pur-
chase a house. While they were visiting the premises, their future next-
door neighbor, a man named Talley, built a 4-foot tall cross in his own
yard and set it on fire. The neighbor complained to Iystanders that
"having n---rs next door" would ruin his property value.
91
Have the Smith's been "threatened"? Focusing attention on the cir-
cumstances of the expression will help answer the question. The
place the speech occurred-a residential neighborhood-is a factor
that the Supreme Court has acknowledged: warrants some shielding
from targeted picketing, i.e., directed expression.92 The reason for
this, privacy in oie's home and the idea that one should be able to
escape from targeted communication at least somewhere, applies
with similar force to one who has signed a purchase agreement to
purchase one's honie. But, I have also argued that the meaning of
the communication is informed by the place in which it occurs.
Suppose the cross had been burned in front of a shopping cen-
ter while hundreds of people passed by, How would the two cross-
burnings differ? There are at least two differences. First, the shop-
ping center cross-burning would appear to be directed not toward a
particular individual or small group,, but, more diffusely, at all those
who might historically have been victims of Klan violence. Ainong
these are blacks and whites sympathetic to black conce rns. Since
this is a large and amorphous group, the determination of whether a
shopping center cross-burning is itself a "threat of violence" would
seem to depend on how many Klansmen were involved and how
strong the Klan sentiment in the community was in relation to the
power and the number of potential victims..
All this suggests that a cross-burning targeted at a particular
individual or family might have a much more powerful impact on.
the victim. This reveals first, that the intensity. and credibility of the
91. This incident is based on State v. Taley, 858 P.2d.217, 220 (Wash. 1993).
92. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988Y.
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message might change depending on the number and scope of people
who receive the communication. With the residential burning there
is no ambiguity in the target. There is no mistaking who is supposed
to receive the message. This counsels that victims will be partially
screened when the target of vicious messages is ambiguous.
Second, it is at least conceivable that someone who viewed the
shopping center burning would be able to leave and still feel at least
somewhat distanced from the people who were doing the communi-
cating and the message of the communication. The cross-burners do
not, after all, live across the street. But this means that when the
cross-burning takes place across the street the burners know who
the victims are and where they live. There is no mistaking the per-
sons to whom the message is directed. Nor is there any safety in
numbers, as there would be if many people like the intended recipi-
ent of the message were present. Therefore, whatever the cross-
burning communicates-whatever would be its message in the
shopping center-is magnified and focused in the residential con-
text.
The burning cross in the residential neighborhood was targeted
at the Smiths. Talley did not burn his cross at just anyone, and he
wasn't trying to use it to organize or inspire other racists. His pur-
pose seemed to be to intimidate. This case therefore differs from
Brandenburg v. Ohio,93 where the Klansmen were burning their
crosses and spouting their invective in a place, so far as the record
revealed, far away from potential victims.
9 4
In order to understand the message conveyed to the Smiths,
one needs to know something about burning crosses in our culture.
How does a burning cross differ from burning a pile of sticks in one's
yard? Clearly, the difference lies in the symbolism inherent in a
"burning cross." Just now I took two pencils in my hand, and crossed
them. Does that action mean anything? If I then attached the pen-
cils at ninety degree angles to each other, would I be burning pencils
or burning a "cross" if I lit them afire? This example suggests that
whatever is significant in the burning object is significant only in
relation to some background information about burning crossed
sticks. Whatever the message is, it cannot be understood apart from
the history of burning crosses in our culture. The burning cross-es-
pecially in front of a black family's house-has been used to intimi-
date blacks for more than a century. The burning cross has often
been followed by a lynching.9 5 Why should a black, or interracial
93. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
94. This distinction is suggested by Justice White's concurring opinion in R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2554 n.4 (1992).
95. See generally DAVID K CHALMERS, HOODED AMERIcmISM: THE HISTORY OF THE
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family, risk physical harm just to live in a neighborhood of their
choosing?
Suppose that when the Smiths arrived Talley had simply
pointed an empty gun across the street at them. No one would argue
that this was not a threat of violence and that such an act would
constitute an assault because of the imminence of the threatened
harm. Why should it make any difference that Taley directed a
burning cross at them? The threat of violence is present in both
cases. One obvious difference lies in the imminence of the threat
with the gun, but this difference explains why the gun-pointer has
committed the tort of assault instead of a mere threat, rather than
explaining why one act is a threat and the other is not.
In Wilson v. Wilkins,' the plaintiff was told that if he did not
leave the community within ten days, a rope would be put around
his neck. The court held that these threats constituted a "wrong,"
without specifying which cause of action they triggered. As long as
the threats were made and taken seriously, it did not matter that
the rope had not yet been purchased, or that the victim had not been
dragged to the tree. The serious promise of future harm was suffi-
cient to make out the prohibited threat.
It is also unclear why the threat posed by waving an empty gun
is any more serious than a directed cross-burning. Both threaten
serious future violence. One answer might be that the victim would
not know that the gun was unloaded, and therefore would assume
someone had the present ability to carry out the threat, but such a
victim would also be unlikely to know whether a crossburner had animminent means of carrying out his threat.
In the face of the history of cross-burning, is it any wonder that
the Smith's decided not to buy the house? What is surprising is that
the Washington Supreme Court did not find these facts sufficient to
establish "criminal harassment," as defined in the Washington
statutes.
Washington State defines criminal harassment to include
words or conduct done with malice "and with the intent to intimi-
date or harass another person", because of race, which "places an-
Ku KLUX KLAN (1981); JAMES RIDGEWAY, BLOOD IN THE FACE: THE Ku KLUX KLAN, ARYAN
NATIONS, NAZI SKInHEADS, AND THE RISE OF A NEW WHITE CULTURE (1990); PATSY SIMS,
THE KLAN (1978).
96. 25 S.W.2d 428 (Ark. 1930). See generally Reynolds C. Seitz, Insults-Practical
Jokes-Threats of Future Harm-How New as Torts?, 28 KY. L.J. 411, 422 (1940)
(suggesting that threats of future harm should be actionable).
97. See also Lyons v. Smith, 3 S.W.2d 982 (Ark. 1928) (holding defendant liable for




other person in reasonable fear of harm to his person or property."18
This harassment may include "(i) cross burning... or (iii) written or
oral communication designed to intimidate or harass" because of
race.9 The statute exempts from this definition "critical, insulting,
or deprecatory" speech or acts "unless the context or circumstances"
are such as to place the recipient "in reasonable fear of harm."'
Surprisingly, although cross-burning was specifically mentioned by
the Washington legislature as intimidating conduct, the Washington
courts found that the defendant's conduct did not fall within the
prohibitions of the statute. 10
What the Washington Supreme Court failed to see when it
evaluated Talley's conduct was exactly what the statute suggested
should be examined: the "context or circumstances" which, the state
legislature rightly understood, would necessarily have to be taken
into account in determining whether given conduct was harassing or
intimidating. What is it about Talley's conduct that is not intimidat-
ing? The court does not specify further reasons for its conclusion, but
one has the sense that it did not fully appreciate the history behind
cross-burning, or perceive how a cross-burning conducted by the
Klan in front of avowed Klan members in an otherwise deserted
field12 is very different from targeted cross-burnings in residential
neighborhoods. I would argue that a residential cross-burning such
as that conducted by Talley constitutes a clear threat of violence.
Incident 3: A black family enters a coffee shop in a small Texas town. A
white man places a card on their table. The card reads, "You have just
been paid a visit by the Ku Klux Klan." The family stands and leaves.
10 3
What is noteworthy about this incident, reported by Professor
Matsuda, is the context in which the incident occurs. Imagine a
white man dropping this card on the table of a black family in a
black-owned coffee shop in which 99% of the patrons are black, and
where the coffee shop is located in the middle of a largely black
community in a large urban city. The result is laughable, as Eddie
Murphy demonstrated in the movie 48 Hours.0 4 While "sprung"
98. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.080(1) (West Supp. 1994).
99. Id. A separate section held cross burning to constitute a per se violation of the
section. Id. § 9A.36.080(2).
100. Id. § 9A.36.080(1)(b).
101. The Washington Supreme Court's complete disposition of the Talley case was:
"We affirm... [the] dismissal of charges against Mr. Talley. While Talley targeted his
victims within the meaning of [the statute], his other conduct did not constitute criminal
harassment, assault, or property damage. Despite Talley's odious behavior, his actions do
not fall within the prohibitions of [the statute]." Talley, 858 P.2d at 231.
102. Cf. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
103. Matsuda, supra note 2, at 2320.
104. 48 HOURS (Paramount Pictures 1982).
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from prison to assist the police, Murphy's character found himself in
a white "cowboy bar" and made all the patrons jump out of deference
to his borrowed badge. This scene happened in a movie, which made
it a good laugh because of the juxtaposition of a purported black law
officer in an arena in which a black man might be in danger. Like-
wise, a Klansman would be unlikely to risk personal danger by
dropping such a card in the middle of a largely black enclave. For
the Klansman, the context means isolation; it means no one is there
to help if trouble erupts; it means that he is vulnerable.
What makes the card-dropping incident intimidating, therefore,
is the vulnerability of the family. This conclusion may strike some as
counter-intuitive, and one might argue that it underemphasizes the
words on the card. This argument can be illustrated nicely by two
examples. Suppose the message said, "You've just been paid a visit
by the Jehovah's Witnesses." Or, suppose the card read, "10% off all
supplies at Mort's Hardware! Bring this card to receive discount!"
The black family would not be intimidated, and would likely be un-
disturbed by either the words on the card or the manner in which
the card was silently dropped. Thus, the argument might run that
the context is irrelevant and all one needs to know is the meaning of
the words on the card to know the meaning of the act. The fact that
someone dropped a card on the table of a family who happened to be
black is not in itself threatening or frightening.
But this argument would misperceive my point about context.
While it is certainly true that one needs to know the words on the
card to know the meaning of the act, the words in this case take on
their threatening character by virtue of the context in which the
words were communicated. In this instance, the words on the card
act as the triggering mechanism for the panoply of factors that un-
doubtedly flashed in one second the message of danger to the black
family. Someone [(1) a man] of a different race [(2) white] dropped a
card on their table and apparently no one else's [(3) thereby singling
them out] in a public place [(4) suggesting that the perpetrator(s)
are "comfortable" doing this act in a public place, apparently without
fear of retribution], in which we infer no other blacks are present [(5)
racial isolation in an all-white restaurant], in a small town [(6) the
"law" in small towns sometimes offer minorities less protection, es-
pecially in the South and especially if few minorities live in the
town, and we know from the civil rights movement that in some in-
stances the sheriff and his deputies are themselves members of the
Klan]' 0 in Texas [(7) a state with a particular reputation on racial
105. The fact the restaurant is located in a small southern town itself provokes
generalizations that are subject to question. Isolated? Conservative? Hometown of the
Grand Wizard himself? Because we lack exact information about this particular town,
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matters]. The threatening nature of the words, the "message," is
given flesh and blood by looking at these other factors.
There is one additional factor that overrides all others in un-
derstanding the message of the threat. Having some understanding
of the Klan and its history is necessary in order to know what was
"said" on the card. Take the Jehovah's Witness example. Would a
black family (or any family) be likely to jump up to leave if this card
were dropped? Not likely. What if the card said, 'You've been paid a
visit by the Jaycees"? This also would not intimidate the family be-
cause there is no history of the Jehovah's Witnesses or the Jaycees
acting violently towards any other group.
It is this violent history that those who invoke the name of the
Klan wish to mirror. 06 To many southern whites, the overturn of
slavery created frightening disorder. Southerners saw the Klan as a
defender of a downtrodden people against black violence. In the pre-
dominantly rural and underpoliced South, the slave patrols and
vigilante, or "popular," justice had traditionally maintained order.
Throughout much of the South after the Civil War, the Klan used
beatings, lynchings and harassment to reinstitute the old order,
and, in great measure, it succeeded. Klansmen revived the practice
of "nightriding," a form of terrorism which dated to the acts of ante-
bellum overseers, who strove to confine slaves within their quarters
at night through fear of mounted, sheet-covered "ghosts." As the
1868 elections approached, intimidation escalated into a wave of as-
sault, murder and assassination in an effort to discourage voting by
blacks and Republicans. The Klan regalia of white robe, hood and
mask served simultaneously to terrorize victims of "whitecapping"
(derived from the Klansman's ghostly garb of hood and mask) and
"bulldozing" (acts of terrorism committed in an effort to overthrow
Republican Party state governments in the South) while concealing
perpetrators' identities. 10
stereotypes take over. But this does not alter the argument in the text, for it is unlikely
that the black family has accurate information about this town either. The family is likely
to act out of stereotypical information about small southern towns, plus whatever specific
information they might have about this particular town. As a result, absent particular-
ized information, the family is likely to assume that the risk of danger is high based on
their general knowledge about small southern towns.
106. The material on the Klan that follows is based on research by Melanie Oxhorn,
a 1994 graduate of Harvard Law School. The principal sources for the following discus-
sion are DAVID M. CHALMERS, HOODED AMERICANISM: THE HISTORY OF THE KU KLUX
KLAN (3d ed. 1981); JAMES RIDGEWAY, BLOOD IN THE FACE: THE KU KLUX KLAN, ARYAN
NATIONS, NAZI SKINSIEADS, AND THE RISE OF A NEW WHITE CULTURE (1990); PATSY SIMS,
THE KLAN (1978); and JOHN TURNER, THE Ku KLUX KLAN: A HISTORY OF RACISM AND
VIOLENCE (2d ed. 1986).
107. In the weeks leading up to the 1868 elections, approximately 2000 blacks were
murdered in Louisiana alone, while 109 were killed in Alabama and 75 in Georgia. The
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The Klan typically outnumbered their victims, used death
threats, random violence and, finally, systematic torture and mur-
ders to instill fear and shock in their victims. Toward black people,
including women and children, they purposefully acted in barbaric
ways. They did this, first, to instill terror in the home of every black
family and impose terrible pressure on the black male voter. Second,
treating black families in unspeakably cruel ways was a statement
that they were inferior and neither their pain nor death mattered.
Klan lynch mobs, led by elected officials, terrorized black communi-
ties.
The Klan was an organized conspiracy against the civil rights
of a large segment of society. So considerable were its powers of in-
timidation in many areas that even officials who opposed it were
helpless against it. Even Klansmen caught red-handed were re-
leased by the justice system and never came to trial. Judges refused
to take sworn testimony from black victims and dismissed the words
of white Republicans.
Although the first Klan died out in the 1870s, social changes in
early twentieth-century America heightened cultural tensions and
gave rise to a new Klan with an expanded purpose. In 1905, Thomas
W. Dixon published The Clansman, An Historical Romance of the Ku
Klux Klan. It became a popular play, which D. W. Griffith made into
an epic movie, The Birth of a Nation. Griffith's movie produced not
only most of the modern film techniques, but also a revival of the
Klan itself. The Dixon-Griffith melodrama showed the South under
the heel of vengeful Radical politicians and brute-like Negroes, but.
in the end the Klan and the South triumphed. The climax came with
Klansmen galloping across the screen to save the heroine, besieged
in a cabin by hordes of lust-crazed blacks.
While this film was bringing cheering audiences to their feet in
an Atlanta movie house, "Colonel" William Simmons resurrected the
Klan in a nocturnal ceremony on nearby Stone Mountain. With all of
the paraphernalia of the world of lodges and secret societies which
he knew so well-the sacred values to be protected from outsiders,
the robes, rituals, prescripts and oath which he copyrighted, the pa-
triotically raised American flag, the revered Holy Bible and the
blazed cross borrowed from Dixon's novel-Simmons initiated his
first heroes. Ever since, Klansmen have used the fiery cross, usually
a tall telegraph pole and its cross piece, wrapped in burlap, bound
on by wire and soaked in kerosene. Lit at the climax of rallies, it is
general goal of the Klan was to drive blacks and Republicans out of politics, and for this,
the Klan paraded, threatened, flogged, rioted and iiurdered. See CHALMERS, supra note
106, at 8-21; TURNER, supra note 106, at 9-10.
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ritual, warning and advertising.'
In the hands of hard-sell promoters, the Klan spread like wild-
fire through the South and across the country. Riding a wave of so-
cial fundamentalism, the "Invisible Empire" that formed in 1915
spread far beyond its southern origins. It preached not only white
supremacy, but nativism and "puritanical virtue" as well. Its stock
in trade were fraternalism, Protestant morality and Americanism.
Applying old means to new ends, masked and hooded Klansmen now
employed intimidation and violence not only against blacks, but also
against Catholics, Jews, "loose women," unfaithful husbands, "labor
agitators," "race mixers" and "Bolsheviks." Klan salesmen, called
Kleagles, recruited among the Masons and other orders and signed
up local ministers and businessmen in a crusade against bootleg-
ging, roadhouse sin and political corruption. 109
The Klan helped to elect governors and senators from Maine to
California and, with a membership of more than two million, was a
major force in the 1924 presidential election."' During the period
from 1920 to 1925, the Klan was responsible for uncounted acts of
terrorism against Jews, blacks and Catholics. But its violence was
concentrated largely in the South and was primarily directed at fel-
low white, native-born Protestants. With Klansmen numerous,
masked, politically active, and police often Klan-minded, usually
little was done. Hundreds, sometimes thousands of men knelt before
flaming crosses in remote fields during night meetings.
By 1926, the Klan's influence was waning in most states. The
Klan remained strong n many pockets of the South, especially in
Alabama and Mississippi, where lynchings and floggings went un-
checked. But elsewhere it was no longer a force.
In the 1950s, however, in the aftermath of Brown v. Board of
Education, the "Invisible Empire" talked about and carried out vio-
lence. In the first four years after the Supreme Court's decision,
there were 530 cases of overt racial violence and intimidation-in-
cluding 6 murders, 29 shootings, 44 beatings, 5 stabbings and the
bombings of 30 homes, 7 churches, 4 synagogues and 4 schools. In
the tense battle over desegregation, 17 southern towns were threat-
ened with mob violence."' The Klan was involved in most.
In the 1950s, the Klan added a new weapon to its arsenal: dy-
namite. With bombs, the Klan no longer singled out one or two peo-
ple, but without warning, it could strike at many with murderous ef-
fectiveness. Between 1956 and 1963, more than 130 homes, places of
108. See CHALMERS, supra note 106 at 22-27; RmDGEWAY, supra note 106 at 34-35.
109. See CHALIERS, supra note 106, at 28-38.
110. See id. at 213-15.
111. See id. at 349-50.
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worship and businesses had been destroyed or damaged by explo-
sions. Police either actively colluded in, or passively tolerated, Klan
violence on a number of occasions."'
Unlike the second Klan, but like the first, the modern organi-
zation was overwhelmingly southern and anti-Negro. Despite con-
tinuing diatribes in Klan speeches and literature against Catholics,
Jews and aliens, nearly all action was aimed at preserving segrega-
tion and white supremacy. Attacks upon communism sprang in
large part from a belief that civil rights advocates and demonstra-
tors were communist-inspired.
To explain the determination behind the civil rights movement
of the 1950s and 1960s, the Klan revived a scapegoat from the
1920s. "The Jewish Conspiracy" helped nourish anxieties and ex-
plained how supposedly happy, uneducated, penniless blacks be-
came militantly demanding. Jewish citizens were among the first
whites to become prominent supporters of or participants in the
black drive for equality. Blacks could not be associated with money,
education or power, but Jews could. "Blacks are the arms and legs,"
and "Jews are the brains," stated a Klan poster."'
In the 1960s, Klansmen engaged in mob violence against civil
rights demonstrators. There were also individual murders. In 1963,
the Klan detonated a bomb during a Sunday school class at a church
in Birmingham, Alabama, killing four black children. In 1964, just
as hundreds of white and black college students began to arrive in
Mississippi pursuant to the Student Nonviolent Coordinating
Committee's (SNCC) massive educational and voter registration
"Freedom Summer," the Klan murdered three student civil rights
workers and buried their bodies in a dam. Largely because whites
were among the victims, world TV coverage and public outrage met
the slayings. Federal agents swept into Mississippi. In 1967, a KKK
Imperial Wizard, the county's chief deputy sheriff and five others
were sentenced to prison for civil rights violations, two for a maxi-
mum of ten years."4
The Klan sees a world divided between their own kind and
"aliens." Even today within the Klavern, special action squads often
exist and the talk is continually of guns and killing. At public rallies,
speakers on flat-back trucks beneath blazing crosses use the implied
threat of violence that "this is the Klan speaking!" The language
which draws the greatest response is tough talk, especially refer-
ences to "n-----."" "
5
112. See TURNER, supra note 106, at 20, 26-27.
113. See CHALMERS, supra note 106, at 351-52.
114. See TURNER, supra note 106, at 28.
115. See SIMs, supra note 106, at 57-76.
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Like the earlier invocations of the Klan, people who today
identify themselves with the Klan work in semi-public ways to carry
out terroristic campaigns against the black population. Members of
the Klan have been responsible for at least hundreds and probably
thousands of mutilations and lynchings throughout its history.
These lynchings have been "public" acts, as they have not been hid-
den from either the white or the black population. Indeed, it is cru-
cial to their campaign of intimidation that the black population be
made aware of the violence against one of their members, violence
perpetrated because of race.
Consequently, invoking the name of the "Klan" constitutes a
conscious effort to invoke this history of violence and to use it to re-
inforce the power of one's own threats. The message, now buttressed
by a history of violence against a class of people, and knowledge by
one's victims of this history, is rendered more powerful because the
class of victims knows that in the past, much of what was threat-
ened has come to pass.
In this context, what is the meaning of the card dropped on the
table in the diner? It means that the black family has been warned
to leave town or risk violence by the Klan. In light of a history of ter-
roristic activities by groups operating under the name of the Klan,
the black family reasonably understands that it is a target. In short,
the family has been threatened with violence."'
This threatening meaning is independent of the speaker's state
of mind. Suppose, for example, that the person who dropped the card
did not "intend" to frighten or alarm the black family. Imagine that
the black family was sitting with a white man whom the card-drop-
per knew was a member of the Klan. Assuming that the black family
may not know this, the person placed the card on the table to warn
the family of their risk. Would the card-dropper now be culpable un-
der my theory?"' It is in this instance that a theory of responsibility
is required. My sense is that, if one adopts a consequentialist ap-
proach to threats, the speaker's intent is not relevant to the question
of whether a threat has been committed. What is relevant are the ef-
fects (or consequences) of the behavior.
This is not to argue for a legal standard which ignores the
speaker's intent. A speaker's intent may be relevant to the determi-
nation of whether the threat should be made criminal or tortious. It
116. Cf Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 293
(1941) (stating that "utterances in a context of violence can lose its significance as an ap-
peal to reason and become part of an instrument of force").
117. I am grateful to David Cope for suggesting this problem.
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may be that an intent requirement will be built in when legal rules
are fashioned. The reason for building in an intent requirement,
however, is not because a threat has not been communicated, but
rather, to leave space for error, and "breathing room" for free
speech.'
C. Critiquing The Contextual Approach
Up to now, I have explored the argument that the meaning of a
given speech act is substantially derived from the context in which it
arises. We can see this in the use of racial epithets. It makes a tre-
mendous difference in meaning to change the identity of the
speaker, the medium in which the expression occurs, the place the
speech occurs, or the identity of the listener. Compare, for example,
a racial slur spoken in a rap song by a black rap group with the
same word spoken by a white man to a black man. The same word
spoken in different contexts takes on completely different meanings.
Applying this concept to the hate speech debate and the idea of
verbal threats, I have attempted to show that whether a given
statement is a regulable "threat" is problematic, and can only be an-
swered by examining the context in which the statement was ren-
dered. As I have tried to convey with the three incidents, a full con-
textual inquiry also necessarily means that we must be willing to
hear the voices of those who are powerless, and to perceive a mes-
sage as threatening when those who are vulnerable perceive it as
threatening.
In this section, I briefly address three limitations or potential
criticisms of a contextualized approach as applied to the problem of
threats of violence. Each limitation stems from the open-ended na-
ture of a contextual approach. One possible criticism is that the gen-
eral debates over hate speech can be replicated within the parame-
ters of a contextual inquiry into what constitutes a threat of vio-
lence. Moreover, all the contending positions could theoretically be
brought to bear in any given case. This would mean that all the
conflicts (e.g., free speech vs. equality) could be reproduced in the
debate over "what is a threat of violence." If the critique is accurate,
a further implication is that narrowing the scope of disputes would
not have resolved anything.
This critique, while partially accurate, does not render the
contextual project hollow. As I have argued above, we don't have a
choice about turning to context; it is only through an examination of
the particularities of a dispute that we can answer the question--did
these events create a threat of violence? The real problem is not
118. Frank Michelman has helped me clarify this point.
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whether to utilize a contextual approach; rather it is in deciding
what details are relevant to whether a "threat of violence" was cre-
ated. And, in deciding what facts are relevant, general principles are
properly invoked.
Turning to context to resolve narrow disputes does not require
us suddenly to abandon strongly-held principles. Most of those who
have struggled over the question of legal regulation of hate speech
have pledged their allegiance to principles of both free speech and
equality. If such principles were easily cabined, or readily applied,
there would be little need for hundreds of law review articles on the
subject of hate speech.
Moreover, although general arguments about the importance of
speech rights or the centrality of equality norms can be brought to
bear on the problem of threats of violence, they are deployed on a
smaller field of discourse. Within the confined framework of
"threats," the power of "free speech" claims dissipates and the force
of "equality" norms increases as the imminence and credibility of the
threat grows in magnitude, becomes more specific, and is more tar-
geted. Similarly, the force of equality norms diminishes, and free
speech claims increase as the threat becomes more removed, vague,
or more generally directed. In contrast, when free speech or equality
claims are invoked within an amorphous, general category such as
"hate speech," the arguments may appear in equipoise because
thinkers often have very different notions of what types of behaviors
fall within the category of "hate speech." But when general princi-
ples are invoked in a particular case, it frequently becomes easier to
sort out which set has greater force in the specific circumstance.
Even if the law's sorting function is not made easier by the narrowly
focused inquiry, the stakes are smaller. The harms arising from er-
roneous rulings in close cases are likely to be small.
A second potential concern arising from the open-textured na-
ture of the inquiry into "what is a threat of violence" might focus on
what details are relevant to resolving a particular dispute. How
wide should we cast the net? What details are not relevant?11 9 In the
preceding sections I have illustrated which factors are likely to be
relevant-that is, the current and historical relationship between
the two or more parties, the relationships between the "groups" to
which each of the parties belongs, the place in which the communi-
cation is made, the method or mode of communication, and the his-
torical setting in which the communication occurs. Still, as with the
119. Martha Minow and Elizabeth Spelman have said that the "call to look at
context typically represents a call to focus on some previously neglected features. It does
not, however, mean focusing on all possible features." Minow & Spelman, supra note 21,
at 1629.
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Supreme Court's approach to the analogous question of what consti-
tutes a sexually discriminatory "hostile work environment," I am
inclined to let this be a case-by-case battle (see the tort discussion
below), in which common law courts, over time, will decide which
facts are particularly probative. Although an attempt to set out rele-
vant "factors" in advance is a mechanism for guiding judgment,
these factors are both indeterminate and inexhaustive. 1"0 Over time,
however, the common law courts will tend to work out a more com-
plete structure of rules and principles.
A third issue arising out of the open-endedness of a contextual
inquiry concerns potential problems of vagueness and unpredict-
ability. Does a contextual approach unduly chill speech? With re-
spect to a vagueness concern, it is difficult to see why a contextual,
tort-based approach would be any more vague than current ap-
proaches to threats of violence. The lack of predictability argument
seems to replicate the familiar rule/standard debate. "Chilling" of
speech may occur, and to the extent that threats of violence are be-
ing chilled, that is a desirable result. The most problematic aspect of
a contextual approach, however, is that standards may make people
fear too much. When I compare my approach to that currently fol-
lowed in the courts in cases involving threats of violence, I do not see
that my approach should trigger any greater concerns about the
chilling of speech. 2' In fact, by focusing on the narrow category of
threats of violence, rather than generally on "hate speech," the risk
of unpredictability should be smaller. But, because this issue con-
cerns me, I am inclined to draw the boundaries of any remedy nar-
rowly and impose an intent requirement.
II. ARE TORT REMEDIES USEFUL IN ADDRESSING HATE SPEECH?
There is at least one arena in which it is common for courts to
look at context in interpreting events: tort law. Common law courts
120. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 371 (1993) (stating that whether
an environment is "hostile" can be "determined only by looking at all the circumstances
[which] ... may include [listing factors] .... But... no single factor is required")
(emphasis added).
121. For instance, the Fair Housing Act prohibits several forms of discriminatory
speech: (1) discriminatory ads, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (1988); (2) "blockbusting" (i.e., scaring
people into selling their homes by suggesting that property values will decline due to
blacks moving into the neighborhood), id. § 3604(e); and (3) coercive or intimidating
speech designed merely to discourage someone from exercising housing rights, id. § 3617.
Courts have enforced these provisions with proper attention to First Amendment claims.
See, e.g., Ragin v. New York Times, 923 F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that the prohibi-
tion of real estate advertisements indicating a racial preference does not violate the First
Amendment), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 81 (1991); Spann v. Colonial Village, Inc., 899 F.2d
24 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (finding liability against landlords and newspapers for using ads with
only white models since they express a racial preference).
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are familiar with case-by-case evolution of doctrine. In evaluating a
claim for negligence in the construction of a house, for example, a
factfinder might find it useful to know, among other things, the
standards in the industry, whether the materials used were stan-
dard, whether the house was constructed in accordance with the
plans and, if so, whether the plaintiff approved the plans with
knowledge of the potential problem. In other words, one cannot
evaluate a claim of negligence without knowing a great number of
particularities. Given that common law courts routinely evaluate
claims of harm by looking to context, tort law might therefore seem a
useful place to begin sorting out the potential remedies for a victim
of threats of racial violence.
Tort law also consists of incremental adjudication of asserted
violations of general rules. It thus offers a mechanism for the finely-
attuned, fact-specific inquiry that is necessary to decide whether
certain behavior constitutes a threat of violence.
In this section, I first address briefly some differences between
tort law and criminal law which suggest the appropriateness of a
tort remedy for racially-motivated threats of violence. I then exam-
ine current tort law. Under current law in most states, none of the
three incidents described in Part II would be likely to result in tort
liability. As I argue in this section, a new, contextually-based tort is
needed in order to redress harms from racial intimidation without
jeopardizing First Amendment freedoms.
A. Tort vs. Crime
A victim of a racially-motivated threat of violence should be
permitted a tort remedy to redress her injuries. Although I am not
opposed to a criminal sanction for such threats, certain features of
tort law make this approach attractive.
Initially, tort law can be seen as a tool of empowerment for vic-
tims. Victims are in control of the litigation and are not dependent
upon the government to prosecute. They can file suit immediately
and can, in appropriate cases, obtain preliminary injunctive relief.
The burden of proof is lower in a civil case, and discovery rules and
other procedural devices make the tort action a tool of investigation.
Additionally, civil rights organizations are often effective in
assisting victims with structural litigation against racist groups that
threaten violence. The Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), for ex-
ample, has used civil litigation to target racist groups that promote
violent acts by others. In one notable case in Oregon, after
"skinheads" beat Mulugeta Seraw to death, the SPLC assisted his
family in winning substantial damages against Tom and John
Metzger and their White Aryan Resistance (WAR) organization for
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encouraging the Portland skinheads to beat "foreigners."'22
Moreover, a tort action permits recovery of compensatory and
punitive damages and may, in some instances, permit injunctive or
other equitable relief. Recent examples of successful litigation in-
clude suits against the Klan for terrorizing Vietnamese fisherman in
Galveston Bay, 23 and suits by the Southern Poverty Law Center
against the Klan and similar organizations in North Carolina.124 In
each of these cases, civil rights lawyers used civil litigation to obtain
damages or injunctive relief against racists who promoted or en-
gaged in violent actions against minorities.
Although in some instances it might be difficult to collect dam-
ages, the possibility of recovering damages for harms has other
benefits. Obtaining a civil judgment-even an unenforceable one-
against a violence-prone organization provides victim groups with a
legal mechanism for investigating the ongoing activities of the or-
ganization and the sources of funds used to support the organiza-
tion's activities.
A civil action also may raise fewer First Amendment concerns
than a criminal prosecution. When the state moves against a
speaker, there is always a fear of the heavy hand of state repression.
Tort law does not raise these concerns to the same degree, particu-
larly since proof of harm is required to recover damages.
B. Current Tort Law
The most likely torts that could be invoked to redress threats of
racial violence are assault, intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress, and in some circumstances, defamation or economic torts.
1. Assault. In order for a victim to prove an assault, she must
prove that the defendant's conduct was intentional and put her in
apprehension of imminent harmful or offensive contact with her
person. 125 The most difficult element to prove in cases of racial
122. Berhau v. Metzger, 850 P.2d 373 (Or. Ct. App. 1993).
123. Vietnamese Fisherman's Ass'n v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 543 F. Supp.
198 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
124. See, e.g., Person v. Miller, 854 F.2d 656 (4th Cir. 1988) (involving class action
suit against the Carolina Knights of the Ku Klux Klan alleging that defendants had en-
gaged in series of violent and intimidating acts intended to prevent black citizens from
freely exercising their constitutional rights); Berhanu v. Metzger, 850 P.2d 373 (Or. Ct.
App. 1993) (involving Southern Poverty Law Center's wrongful death action against
White Aryan Resistance).
125. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 21 (1964) [hereinafter SECOND RE-
STATEMENT]. The defendant must have acted "(a) ... intending to cause a harmful or of-
fensive contact with the person of the other or a third person, or an imminent apprehen-
sion of such a contact, and (b) the other is thereby put in such imminent apprehension." Id.
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threats is the element of imminence: many racial threats that create
apprehension in the victim do not create apprehension of
"imminent" contact. To establish a case of assault for threats of vio-
lence under the Restatement, it is insufficient to show that the
plaintiff was frightened by those threats. For example, if the defen-
dant threatens to shoot someone, and leaves the room to get his
pistol, the victim has not been assaulted. 126 It would be necessary to
prove that the threats would result in immediate violence unless
something or someone intervened. 127 Similarly, simply saying to
someone, 'Tm going to kill you," would not result in tort liability
unless the speaker took some immediate action (for example, lifting
his arm, activating a switchblade, or stepping forward with fist
raised) to carry out the threat.28
As a consequence of the imminence limitation, the tort of as-
sault is of no utility when a threat is of future violence, when the
perpetrator makes a conditional threat, or when the threat is said to
be "mere words."29 A graphic example of limiting the tort of assault
to threats of immediate violence is contained in Dickens v.
Puryear.10 In Dickens, the defendant had participated in beating up
the plaintiff for two hours. Moments later, he threatened to kill the
126. Id. § 29, illus. 4. It is possible that such actions would satisfy the element of
outrageousness for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The plaintiff, of course,
would be required to prove the other elements of that tort. See infra part III.B.2 for
discussion of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
127. Thus, even though the harm that occurs when someone has been threatened
with violence may be imminent in the sense of creating psychic harm at the moment the
recipient perceives the threat, the perception is not of imminent harmful contact and is
not remediable as an assault.
128. See O.D. v. State, 614 So. 2d 23 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that yelling
across a street, "before I'm twenty-one, you will be dead" is not a criminal assault because
the threat is not imminent and no overt act is directed at victim). See also Cucinotti v.
Ortmann, 159 A.2d 216, 218 (Pa. 1960) (finding no assault where defendants were alleged
to have threatened plaintiffs with violence unless they moved out of the neighborhood;
holding based in part on fact that plaintiffs did not allege defendants took some overt ac-
tion to carry out the threats). Cf. Johnson v. Brooks, 567 So. 2d 34 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1990) (holding that defendant who called victim on phone several times, telling her she
would burn in hell, and that defendant was attempting to locate victim's son, coupled
with fact defendant had previously harmed others, was not sufficient to constitute crimi-
nal assault).
129. Dickens v. Puryear, 276 S.E.2d 325, 331 (N.C. 1981) (holding that "[a] mere
threat, unaccompanied by an offer or attempt to show violence, is not an assault"); W.
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 10, at 40 (5th ed.
1984) (stating that "[tlhreats for the future... are simply not present breaches of the
peace, and so never have fallen within the narrow boundaries of [assault]"). See also
SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 125, at § 31, cmt. a, illus. 1 ("A, known to be a resolute
and desperate character, threatens to waylay B on his way home on a lonely road on a
dark night. A is not liable to B for an assault .....
130. 276 S.E.2d 325 (1981).
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plaintiff unless he went home, pulled his telephone off the wall,
packed his clothes, and left the state. The plaintiff was then set free.
The court found that this threat was not one of imminent, or imme-
diate, harm, but was a threat for the future, and was therefore
"actionable, if at all, as an intentional infliction of mental dis-
tress."'31
Similarly, no liability is found where the defendant makes a
conditional threat. In Brooker v. Silverthorne,'3' the male defendant
abused a female telephone operator when she was unable to make
his connection. He said, "You God damned woman. None of you at-
tend your business.... You are a God damned liar. If I were there, I
would break your God damned neck."33 The court reversed a jury
verdict for the plaintiff because the plaintiff was not in the defen-
dant's presence when he made the statements, and, according to the
court, "the words used did not amount to a threat" because there
was "nothing in what [the defendant] said expressive of an intention
to go [where the plaintiff was] and injure plaintiff."
34
In addition, the Restatement authors emphasize that "mere
words" do not ordinarily constitute an assault, unless combined with
other acts they put the victim in reasonable apprehension of immi-
nent offensive contact. 13 For example, yelling, at someone while
shaking a finger in his face has been found sufficient to create a jury
question of whether the defendant's threats created the necessary
apprehension of imminent harm.3 6 However, speaking the words
"[]et's duke it out" and "I wouldn't be surprised if my wife-if while
you're working... took a gun and shot you" did not result in liability
for assault because the speaker took no overt action to carry out any
violence.
13
131. Id. at 336. See also Cucinotti, 159 A.2d at 218 (finding no assault where
defendants were alleged to have threatened plaintiffs with violence unless they moved out
of the neighborhood).
132. 99 S.E. 350 (S.C. 1919).
133. Id. at 351.
134. Id. at 352. See also CLARENCE MORRIS & C. ROBERT MORRIS, JR., MORRIS ON
TORTS 23 (2d ed. 1980) (noting that an assault cannot be committed over the telephone
because the speaker cannot immediately carry out the threats). Cf. Johnson v. Brooks,
567 So. 2d 34 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (finding telephone threats not assault because de-
fendant did no act to suggest violence was imminent).
135. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 125, at § 31. See also Cucinotti, 159 A.2d at
218 (finding no assault where defendants were alleged to have threatened plaintiffs with
violence unless they moved out of the neighborhood because "[w]ords in themselves, no
matter how threatening, do not constitute an assault"). See generally PROSSER ON TORTS,
supra note 129, at 57-65.
136. Allen v. Walker, 569 So. 2d 350 (Ala. 1990).
137. Bollaert v. Witter, 792 P.2d 465, 466 (Or. Ct. App. 1990). See also Cucinotti, 159
A.2d at 219 (holding that plaintiffs' allegations that defendants threatened them with
immediate beatings insufficient to make out assault unless defendants displayed the
1994] 693
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
It should be noted that threats of violence could easily have
been prohibited by the tort of assault, but for an historical accident.
When addressing the limited interest served by the tort of assault,
the Restatement authors comment on the anomaly of protecting a
person's mental state from the threat of imminent blows, but not
(until recently, with the advent of the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress) from other types of emotional disturbances re-
sulting, for example, from threats of future violence or threats di-
rected at a family member.138 That this anomaly can no longer be
justified is suggested even by the Restatement authors, who, in not-
ing that words alone cannot make out an action for assault, observe:
This is true even though the mental discomfort caused by a threat of seri-
ous future harm on the part of one who has the apparent intention and
ability to carry out his threat may be far more emotionally disturbing than
many of the attempts to inflict minor bodily contacts which are actionable
as assaults. 39
Thus, a more serious harm is not penalized, while a harm whose ef-
fects are modest does not even require proof of damages.
Assault is not available in any of the three incidents described
above because there is no threat of imminent violence. In addition,
the plaintiff is not likely to have been found to have reasonably ap-
prehended imminent violent action. Thus the tort of assault is likely
to have only limited utility in actions involving hate speech which
threatens violence.
2. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. To make out a
cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, most
courts require that the plaintiff prove that the defendant (1) en-
gaged in "extreme and outrageous conduct" (2) with the intention to
cause (or recklessly causing) (3) severe emotional distress. 140 The
most difficult elements to prove are that the conduct was sufficiently
weapons in such a manner as to amount to an offer to hit the plaintiffs).
138. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 125, at § 24, cmt. c. See also § 29 and com-
ment. In part, the historical accident appears to have stemmed from the early common
law regulating violence between men [sic]. The early actions, trespass for battery and
trespass for assault, protected men from the immediate infliction of damage. Either form
of trespass was sufficient to trigger the right of self-defense. The law of assault "worked
on the assumption that unless a man was threatened by the immediate application of
force, he had no cause to fear because if he were allowed an interval, he could take steps
to protect himself from the actual consummation of a battery." Seitz, 28 Ky. at 422. For
example, in Tuberville v. Savage, 1 Mod. Rep. 3 (1669), the defendant put his hand to his
sword and said, "If it were not assize time, I would not take such language from you." The
defendant's behavior was offered into evidence to prove a provocation justifying the
plaintiffs responsive violence. Id.
139. SEcOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 125, at § 31 cmt. a.
140. Id. § 46 (1965).
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outrageous and caused the victim severe emotional distress." A few
words about the contours of the tort are necessary before proceeding
to a discussion of its limited utility in the context of threats of racial
violence.
Although the definition of "extreme and outrageous" behavior
is, of course, nebulous, both the Restatement authors and numerous
courts have emphasized that such behavior does not extend to
"mere" insults, indignities, or threats.'42 Shouts, loud arguments, or
even malicious conduct not rising to the level of "outrageous" is in-
sufficient to satisfy this element of the tort. The conduct must be so
"extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency,
and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized
community."
143
Two examples will illustrate the stringent demands of the out-
rageousness element even when potentially serious threats are in-
volved.44 First, in Moses v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America,45 the
plaintiff had received a threatening message from his former boss on
his telephone answering machine advising him to quit soliciting his
141. It is sometimes difficult to show that the defendant, while intending to cause
the plaintiff emotional disturbance, intended to create in the plaintiff "severe emotional
distress." See, e.g., Kentucky Fried Chicken Nat. Mgt. Co. v. Weathersby, 607 A.2d 8 (Md.
1992).
142. SEcOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 125, at § 46 cmt. d.
143. Id. One case in which the court found this element satisfied is S & W Seafoods
v. Jocor Broadcasting, 390 S.E.2d 228 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989). In that case, a radio broad-
caster conducting a restaurant review became enraged at the manager of a restaurant.
During his broadcast, he urged listeners to "[gbo by and see this guy... [and tiell him he
stinks", "go by and spit in his face for me", and "[gbo by there today and give a little five
fingers in the face.., to (him]." Id. at 230. The court found that these comments were
incitements to others to do violence to the manager (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444 (1969)), and reversed the lower court's grant of summary judgment against the man-
ager on his claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id.
144. For examples of these stringent demands, see Vance v. Southern Bell Tel. &
Tel. Co., 983 F.2d 1573 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding that employer's racially hostile miscon-
duct to black employee, including placement of nooses at her work station, did not rise to
level of outrageousness required for intentional infliction of emotional distress claim);
Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 743 S.W.2d 380 (Ark. 1988) (holding that employer's sus-
tained conduct designed to force suspected whistleblower to resign, including elimination
of job, re-assignment to lower position, repeated criticism of job performance and repri-
mands for acts he had not done insufficient to support finding of tort of outrage); Hogan v.
Forsyth Country Club Co., 340 S.E.2d 116, 123 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that man-
ager's conduct "was not so extreme and outrageous" as to give rise to a claim for inten-
tional infliction of mental or emotional distress when he "refused to grant [female em-
ployee] a pregnancy leave of absence, directed her to carry heavy objects..., cursed at
her..., [refused her request] to leave work to go to the hospital... [and] terminated her"
when she went anyway); id. at 122-23 (holding that male co-employee's conduct in
screaming at female employee, interfering with her supervision of waitresses, and
throwing menus at her not sufficient to find intentional infliction of emotional distress).
145. 369 S.E.2d 541 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988).
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former employer's customers "or you are going to find your butt in
court or your neck broken somewhere."146 This conduct was held not
to be sufficiently outrageous to warrant application of the distress
tort.147 Second, the Restatement authors use the Brooker v. Silvert-
home14 facts (involving the telephone operator) to illustrate conduct
which "although insulting" is not sufficiently extreme to satisfy this
element.1
To make out an intentional infliction claim, it is also necessary
that the plaintiff demonstrate that she experienced severe emotional
distress. It is insufficient that the plaintiff simply worry and suffer.
"It is only where [the distress] is extreme that the liability arises."'
The distress must be so severe that "no reasonable man (sic) could
be expected to endure it. " 5 '
With respect to threats of racial violence, the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress is likely not to be very useful, largely
because of the restrictive way in which courts have interpreted the
tort's elements. Initially, the question will be whether the "threat" is
considered sufficiently "outrageous" to satisfy the first element. In
general, I would argue that a threat of racially-inspired violence
should meet this part of the test, but that whether courts will regard
it as meeting the requirement is not at all clear.
There are at least two reasons why a threat of racial violence
should be treated as satisfying the "outrageousness" element. First,
the Restatement authors themselves suggested that a person's spe-
cial vulnerability could "up the ante" on conduct that might other-
wise be offensive but not "outrageous." The Restatement authors
may have been referring to a situation such as a physically disabled
person being subjected to rowdy conduct and suffering severe dis-
tress while a person without such a disability might have suffered
distress but not severe distress.152 A principle of special vulnerability
could easily extend to a victim of a racial threat in certain contexts.
For example, in an incident reported by my colleague, Lydia Nayo, a
white motorcyclist felt safe enough to utter his obscenities at a black
woman, even though she was driving a jeep and he a motorcycle.5 3
146. Id. at 542.
147. Id. at 544.
148. 99 S.E. 350 (1918); see supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
149. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 125, at § 46 cmt., illus. 4.
150. Id. § 46 cmt. j.
151. Id. The comment also notes that, while the distress must be severe, "the ex-
treme and outrageous character of the defendant's conduct is in itself important evidence
that the distress has existed." Id. This comes close to saying that emotional damage may
be presumed in cases in which the conduct is severe.
152. The defendant's knowledge that plaintiff is particularly susceptible to emo-
tional distress is a special factor. See, e.g., id. cmt., illus. 9-13.
153. See supra note **** and accompanying text.
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He did not feel vulnerable to physical injury, although the black
woman did. Minority racial status in this society necessarily makes
a person of color vulnerable to racial attacks. In addition, it leads
the majority person to think he is less vulnerable in relation to the
"other.' 5 4
Second, our society has a dismal history of racial violence
against minorities. Threats of racial violence all too often lead to
violence. 5 ' A cross-burning not only intimidates and threatens, but
often precedes intense violence. 56 It is against this backdrop that
threats of racial violence must be considered. It is not at all unusual
in tort law to consider the social relationships between the parties
when deciding whether certain conduct subjects the actor to liabil-
ity. For example, in deciding whether a man who touches a woman's
armpit has committed a battery, it is important to know whether
they are strangers to each other or smooching on a date, or whether
he is her teacher or her plumber. It may also be important to know
whether they are children on a playground, or whether an older man
is preying on an inexperienced young woman.
When deciding whether conduct is "outrageous" under the Re-
statement, the power relationship between the parties can be central
to the decision."5 7 For example, in Agis v. Howard Johnson Co.,1 8 the
manager of the defendant's restaurant called all the waitresses to-
gether, informed them that "some stealing" was going on, and stated
that until he learned who was responsible he would begin firing all
the waitresses in alphabetical order, starting with the plaintiff.15 9 He
then fired Agis. In upholding a cause of action for intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress, the court emphasized the fact that the
manager held power over the waitresses and had abused his
power.60 Similarly, the racial status of parties to each other at the
154. See, e.g., Thomas Huff, Addressing Hate Messages at the University of Montana:
Regulating and Educating, 53 MONT. L. REV. 157, 169 (1992).
155. See Montana Outrage Stalls Skinheads, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1994, § 1, at 38
(reporting a rising series of incidents as related by the Billings, Montana chief of police).
See also Matsuda, supra note 2. In presenting what she calls "hard cases" involving racist
speech, Matsuda discusses the long history of subordination and violence minority groups
have experienced, arguing that there needs to be "clarity about the historical context in
which racist speech arises" in order to "lift us out of the neutrality trap." Id. at 2361,
2374.
156. See, e.g., State v. Talley, 858 P.2d 217 (Wash. 1993); see generally United States
v. Hayward, 6 F.3d 1241 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Lee, 6 F.3d 1297 (8th Cir. 1993);
United States v. McDermott, 822 F. Supp. 582 (D.C. Iowa 1993).
157. See SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 125, at § 46 cmt. e. See generally LEE
LINDAHL, MODERN TORT LAW-LIABIUTY & LITIGATION § 32.03, at 133-135 (rev. ed. 1988);
STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., 4 THE AtEIcAN LAW OF TORTS § 16.21, at 1094 (1987).
158. 355 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1976).
159. Id. at 317.
160. Id.; see also SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 125, at § 46, cmt. e. (explaining
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time of the disputed events is one of those factors that can aid a
court in determining the seriousness of a racial threat. Racial differ-
ence is a factor that should be considered when deciding whether
racist speech is "outrageous."
But even if racial threats of violence were considered suffi-
ciently "outrageous," the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress would still be ineffective in redressing the harms from such
threats. This is because the reasons for protecting someone from ra-
cially-motivated threats of violence have to do with preventing the
fear such threats generate and reducing the limitations on the
plaintiffs freedom of action, rather than protecting the plaintiff
against only those actions that create serious emotional harm. In
cases involving threats of violence, requiring a plaintiff to prove that
she suffered serious emotional distress largely limits the utility of
this tort. Indeed, while many people may suffer severe emotional
distress upon receiving a single, racially-motivated threat, the
harms that justify regulation of a violent, racist threat do not neces-
sarily involve such serious psychological harm. Racist threats of
violence create fear and stress in their victims, disrupt daily lives,
create a risk that the threat will be consummated, interfere with
equal opportunities for a healthy social life, and endanger inter-
group relations.' 6' These harms often will be present even if the vic-
tim cannot prove that she suffered severe emotional distress.
162
3. Defamation. If words result in injury to the plaintiffs repu-
tation, then the plaintiff may have a cause of action for defamation.
In order to have an actionable case of defamation, the plaintiff must
prove that the statements made about him are capable of being
proven true or false.163 However, the statements made to the plain-
tiff typically do not purport to be assertions of fact, and usually the
that extreme and outrageous character of the conduct may arise from abuse of position or
power); S & W Seafoods v. Jocor Broadcasting, 390 S.E.2d 228 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989)
(including the power of radio broadcaster as a factor in determining outrageousness);
Agarwal v. Johnson, 603 P.2d 58 (Cal. 1979) (emphasizing fact employee's supervisor had
power over him, and this power was a significant factor in determining the
"outrageousness" of the supervisor's conduct).
161. See supra part I.A
162. The fact that serious harms can accompany verbal sexual harassment on the
job, even in the absence of severe emotional distress, prompted the Supreme Court to re-
verse a lower court's requirement that a victim of sexual harassment had to prove that
her "psychological well-being" had been "seriously affected" by the harassment. Instead,
the Court pointed to other harms, namely, an abusive work environment that can detract
from the employee's job performance, cause victims to quit, or interfere with their ad-
vancement. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370-71 (1993).
163. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990); see also Hustler Maga-
zine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988).
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statements are meant to insult, offend or outrage the victim rather
than communicate some false statement of fact about the plaintiffs
reputation to a third party. Consequently, abusive language, no
matter how offensive, is not actionable as defamation. 1' Moreover,
threats of violence-and in particular threats of racial violence--do
not usually trigger claims of defamation since the interest at stake
lies in peace of mind rather than reputation.
4. Economic Torts. Where the statements or actions interfere
with the plaintiffs economic or property interests, several economic
torts are potentially available. For example, intentional interference
with contractual relations has been invoked to protect an employee
from racial or sexual harassment that results in his or her dis-
charge.'65 Although potentially useful in job bias claims against fel-
low employees, these torts cannot address much hate speech.
Some other potential remedies are directed at economic torts
that infringe on civil rights. For example, where the defendant tres-
passes on the plaintiffs property by, for example, writing anti-semi-
tic slurs on synagogue walls, the federal statute that creates a civil
action for racially-motivated property crimes may be invoked. 66 But,
again, these civil rights statutes only come into play in certain cir-
cumstances.
In sum, many of the torts which could potentially be used to
protect victims of racial threats from the harm that befalls them are
limited in some significant fashion. Although courts have, on occa-
sion, allowed the torts of assault or intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress to be used in circumstances analogous to what I pro-
pose here, it is preferable to create a tort that is explicitly available
to address threats of racial violence.
D. ANew Tort?
None of these torts appear to provide sufficient protection for
the crux of the complaint about racially-motivated threats of vio-
lence: the threat of violence that is not imminent or that is merely
164. RODNEY A. SMOLLA., LAW OF DEFAMATION § 6.12110] at 6-67 (1986). Smolla
notes that these decisions are reached sometimes because such accusations are consid-
ered "opinion", but sometimes because "mere epithets are not considered to carry a de-
famatory meaning." Id.
165. See, e.g., Guyette v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 518 F. Supp 521 (D.N.J. 1981)
(holding that employees alleging sex discrimination stated claim for interference with
contractual relations); McHugh v. University of Vermont, 758 F. Supp 945 (D. Vt. 1991)
(holding that employee stated cause of action based on intentional interference with con-
tractual relations against co-worker who allegedly harassed employee on account of her
sex and religion), affd, 966 F.2d 67 (2d. Cir. 1992).
166. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1988).
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implicit. That is, none of the traditional torts will lead courts to
consider relevant some of the contextual factors that are particularly
connected to the three racial threat incidents discussed above. Thus,
I propose developing a tort of racial intimidation. The tort would
consist of personally-directed verbal or other conduct that is reason-
ably taken to encompass threats of violence.
6 7
The tort of racial intimidation (or racial threat) would be de-
fined as follows:
Threats of Racial Violence:
An actor is subject to liability to another for threats of racial violence if:
a. he acts intending to cause another apprehension of violence to
his person or to the person of another;
b. his actions are motivated by racial animus; and
c. the other person is thereby reasonably put in fear of violence
to her person or that of another.
Thus, the tort would specifically allow recovery to one who could
show she was threatened by another with violence, that the threats
were motivated by racial animosity, and that she reasonably feared
the violence. Below I examine some of the benefits as well as the
limitations of the tort.
167. Many states have adopted criminal statutes in which threats of violence are the
crux of legal liability. A number of states have statutes that prohibit ethnic intimidation,
harassment or threats. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.26 (Consol. Supp. 1993)
(penalizing a person who "attempts or threatens" to "strike, shove, kick or otherwise sub-
ject [another] person to physical contact" or "engages in a course of conduct or repeatedly
commits acts which alarm or seriously annoy such other person and which serve no le-
gitimate purpose"); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.46.020 (West 1988) (penalizing threats
which "by words or conduct" convince a reasonable person that a threat will be carried
out). Other statutes penalize threats made in interstate commerce; see, e.g., 18 U.S.c.
§ 875 (West 1984 & Supp. 1993); 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (1984 & Supp. 1994); or threats
which involve using the mails, see, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. tit. 53a, § 182(b) (West
Supp. 1994). Threats made over the telephone are prohibited, see, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. 16-
11-39 (West 1992), as are threats of violence that are part of a blackmail scheme, see, e.g.,
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-501(2)(e) (1993).
The common law has also recognized, in other contexts, that threats of violence can
be made the subject of liability. In determining whether someone has been unlawfully
confined for purposes of the tort of false imprisonment, for example, nearly all courts rec-
ognize that even without actual force, confinement can be obtained by "means of threats
of force or other means of intimidation or fear of violence." FOwLERV. HARPER ET AL., THE
LAW OF TORTS § 3.7, at 293 (2d ed. 1986); see also Gust v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 136
S.W.2d 94 (Mo. 1939) (holding that restraint of one's liberty may occur through threats of
force, and words alone may suffice to restrain someone against their will); State Rubbish
Collectors Ass'n. v. Siliznoff, 240 P.2d 282 (Cal. 1952) (recognizing a cause of action where
the defendant intentionally subjected another to "serious threats to his physical well-be-
ing" regardless of whether the threats constituted a technical assault).
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1. Contours of the tort. Several features of the proposed tort of
racial intimidation (or racial threat) are worth noting:
a. First, I am not proposing a general tort of "threatened vio-
lence."16 8 It may be that such a tort should be adopted. However, my
purpose is to argue that there are special considerations governing
racial threats, and that courts should adopt a tort of racial intimi-
dation regardless of whether it is a good idea to adopt a more gen-
eral tort theory involving threats of violence.
Nevertheless, adopting the proposed tort rather than a more
general one does raise substantial First Amendment concerns in
light of R.AV. v. City of St. Paul 69 and Wisconsin v. Mitchell.70 In
R.AV., the Supreme Court called into question regulatory mecha-
nisms that treat the subcategory of racist fighting words differently
from other fighting words where the distinction is drawn on the ba-
sis of the content of the communication. R.AV. involved the prose-
cution of a teenager who burned a cross on the lawn of a black fam-
ily. The City of St. Paul had enacted an ordinance which, as nar-
rowed by the Minnesota Supreme Court, banned the expression of
"fighting words" (i.e., "conduct that itself inflicts injury or tends to
incite immediate violence") that insulted or provoked violence "on
the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender.'' The Court held
that because the ordinance punished only the subcategory of fight-
ing words that involved racist and other kinds of hate speech, it was
an impermissible content-based regulation of speech.17 Accordingly,
the teenager could not be prosecuted under this ordinance.
After R.AV., many commentators worried about the constitu-
tionality of other civil rights statutes that prohibited racist speech
which caused detrimental consequences. For example, "hate crime"
statutes around the country punished crimes motivated by race;
among other things, more severely than crimes not so motivated. In
several law review articles and in a series of court cases, commenta-
tors and judges called into question the constitutionality of these
statutes in light of R.AV. 73 The basic argument was that these
statutes punished "thought crimes," since they punished crimes
conducted with "racial motivation"--a thought process-more se-
verely than the same crimes conducted without such bias.
However, in Mitchell, the Court held that such penalty-
enhancement statutes were valid under the First Amendment, and.
168. See generally Seitz, supra note 96, at 422.
169. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
170. 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993).
171. R4.AV., 112 S. Ct. at 2541.
172. Id. at 2547-48.
173. See, e.g., Gellman, supra note 48.
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distinguished R.AV. on two grounds. First, the ordinance in R.A.V.
was "explicitly directed at expression (i.e., 'speech' or 'messages')
[while] the statute in this case is aimed at conduct .... 1 74 Second,
the Court accepted Wisconsin's argument that bias-motivated
crimes created greater individual and social harms such as higher
risk of retaliatory violence, distinct emotional harms to their vic-
tims, and incitement of community unrest.
175
The speech/conduct distinction 176 drawn by Chief Justice Rehn-
quist would not assist a state seeking to make racially-motivated
threats of violence tortious, for by hypothesis the threats are
"verbal." Thus, upholding differential treatment of such threats
would seem to depend on whether the harms justify singling out ra-
cially-motivated threats.
177
An analysis of the Court's treatment of threats against the
President may provide a basis for finding a special sanction against
racial threats of violence constitutional. In Watts v. United States,7 '
the Court, in upholding the facial validity of a federal statute crimi-
nalizing threats against the life of the President, concluded that the
nation had an overwhelming interest in "protecting the safety of its
Chief Executive and in allowing him to perform his duties without
interference from threats of physical violence." 79
This statute was also used by Justice Scalia in R.AV. to illus-
trate his argument that the government could only discriminate
174. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct at 2201 (citation omitted).
175. Id. The Court said that the state's reference to the additional harms "provide[d]
an adequate explanation" for the enhancement provision for bias-motivated crimes "over
and above mere disagreement with offenders' beliefs or biases." Id.
176. This distinction has been severely criticized by numerous constitutional law
scholars as conclusory. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AAIERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 12-7, at 827 (2d ed. 1988) (stating that "any particular course of conduct may be hung
almost randomly on the 'speech' peg or the 'conduct' peg as one sees fit"); see also John H.
Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First
Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1494-96 (1975) (stating that "burning a
draft card to express opposition to the draft is an undifferentiated whole, 100% action and
100% expression").
For criticisms of the distinction as applied in Mitchell, see Morton J. Horwitz, For-
ward, The Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107
HARV. L. REV. 32, 116 (1993); Frederick M. Lawrence, Resolving the Hate Crimes/Hate
Speech Paradox: Punishing Bias Crimes and Protecting Racist Speech, 68 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 673 (1993); and Cass R. Sunstein, WORDS, CONDUCT, CASTE, 60 U. CH. L. REV. 795
(1993).
177. Put in Mitchell's terms, the question would be whether the "State's desire to
redress [the] perceived harm ] provides an adequate explanation" for treating racially-
motivated threats more severely. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2201. This formulation suggests
that, at-least in Mitchell, the Court did not require the state to offer a "compelling" justifi-
cation, but only an "adequate" one.
178. 394 U.S 705 (1969).
179. Id. at 707.
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within categories of proscribable speech if the reason for the dis-
crimination was the same reason that justified the categorical ex-
clusion in the first place."" In explaining why the federal govern-
ment could single out for special sanction threats against the life of
the President, Justice Scalia contended that the reasons why threats
of violence generally were outside the First Amendment have
"special force when applied to the person of the President."181
Therefore, one might distinguish R.A.V. from the present tort
proposal by arguing that the reasons why threats of violence are
regulable (i.e., they coerce victims, inflict emotional harm, under-
mine civil rights, and raise the possibility of retaliatory violence)
have "special force" when applied to bias-motivated threats of vio-
lence. 82 Some of these concerns, however, were also present in the
fighting words context, yet the Court struck down the St. Paul ordi-
nance in R.AV. By rejecting this "special force" argument when
applied to fighting words and the St. Paul ordinance, the R.AV.
Court seemed to signal an unwillingness to allow the state to con-
clude that the special harms of hate speech justified special regula-
tion. Although, in R.AV., the Court found the interest in ensuring
basic human rights "compelling," the Court also concluded that the
differential treatment on the basis of the content of bias-speech was
"unnecessary" to achieve the city's purpose. 18
Thus, if singling out bias-motivated threats of violence for spe-
cial attention will survive the current Court's scrutiny, it will have
to stem from the Court's willingness to allow a state to find that the
harms of such threats are sufficiently different from other threats to
warrant special attention. As I have argued above, the special harms
of racially motivated threats would justify singling out such
threats. 8'
180. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2542-47.
181. Id. at 2546.
182. Indeed, in at least two respects, Watts is an even harder case to justify under
First Amendment principles than the proposal here. First, the federal statute at issue in
Watts does not require that the threat be made personally to the President. That statute
is now found at 18 U.S.C. §871(a) (1988). Second, the case for allowing vituperative and
abusive commentary about the functioning of the government-and anything involving
the President is of such a nature-is stronger than the case for allowing vituperation and
abuse to be directed at someone not affiliated with a position of such power. Cf. Post,
Public Discourse, supra note 9; see also New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270
(1964) (stating that "debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,
and... may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks
on government and public officials").
183. 112 S. Ct. at 2549-50. The Court held that since St. Paul could ban all fighting
words, including those words subject to the ordinance, it was required to exercise that
option rather than singling out racist fighting words for special prohibition. Id.
184. See supra notes 31-51 and accompanying text.
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b. Second, the tort combines features of an assault action with
features of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. I
adapt the prima facie case of assault, but substitute "threats of vio-
lence" for "imminent harmful or offensive contact." One consequence
of this shift is to move the action back in time so that if harm is
threatened, but the threatened violence is not imminent, the in-
tended victim will still have a cause of action. This provides broader
protection for a plaintiffs interests in emotional security.
The tort also borrows from the emotional distress claim by ar-
ticulating a narrow definition of what might be termed "outrageous"
conduct: namely, conduct that threatens violence. As a result, the
amorphous category of "outrageousness" is replaced in the tort of
racial threat by a more focused inquiry into threatening conduct.
However, the new tort would not require proof of severe emotional
distress as part of the prima facie case. The reason, as noted previ-
ously, is that the interests protected by the two torts are very differ-
ent. The crux of the harm from racial threats of violence is not se-
vere emotional distress, but rather, fear, coercion and restraint of
freedom. It is for this reason that "hate speech" regulations which
require a victim to prove that she suffered severe emotional distress
as an element of liability seem misguided. 8"
Limiting the tort to threats of violence means that, at least for
present purposes, many types of vituperative racist language would
not be made tortious. Insults, epithets, and language that demeans
or offends on grounds of race would not be penalized, so long as it
does not result in intimidation.186 Racist speeches 1 7 or publica-
tions,18 scurrilous lies'89 and public marches by Nazis through
Skokie' 90-a community in which many Jewish survivors of the holo-
caust live-would not be targeted by the tort, unless they encom-
passed personally-directed threats of violence. Limiting the tort in
185. See, e.g., the University of Texas hate speech regulation, which requires proof
of severe emotional distress before the complaining party's allegations will be treated se-
riously. PRESIDENT'S AD Hoc COMM. ON RACIAL HARASSMENT, THE UNiV. OF TEX. AT
AUSTIN, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S AD HOC COMMITTEE ON RACIAL HARASSMENT (1989),
cited in Post, Free Speech, supra note 4, at 274 n.38.
186. Compare the approaches taken by Delgado and Jean Love. Delgado, Words that
Wound, supra note 43; and Jean C. Love, Discriminatory Speech and the Tort of Inten-
tional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 123 (1990).
187. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
188. See, e.g., Beauharnais v. fllinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
189. For example, denying the existence of the holocaust. See Eric Stein, History
Against Free Speech: The New German Law Against the 'Auschwitz'-and Other--'Lies',
85 MICH. L. REV. 277 (1986).
190. Collin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Ill. 1978), affd., 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978); Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party, 366
N.E.2d 347 (Ill. Ct. App. 1977), affd in part and rev'd in part, 373 N.E.2d 21 (Ill. 1978).
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this fashion might be criticized because it does not address many of
the concerns with racist speech that critical race theorists have
identified.'' As I have acknowledged, this approach is indeed lim-
ited, but it does leave open the possibility that with proper justifica-
tion, another tort could be developed that addresses other egregious,
personally-directed, racist invective. However, any such expansion
to other forms of expression should be done on a case-by-case basis,
with consideration of the sorts of general principles discussed in this
Article.
One consequence of this sort of limitation is that many people
of color who experience all racist speech as implicating threats of
violence against them will not recover under this tort. The problem
is not a lack of harm; rather, consistent with the First Amendment
and policy considerations, some space must be left for society and
individuals within society to work out continuing accommodations in
race relations through speech.
Turning to the specific elements of the tort of racial threat, the
following observations should be made:
Element (a) requires proof of personally-directed threats. This
would not, for example, include arguments or attacks directed to or
about a larger audience, unless the statements were clearly directed
at a particular individual (or small group of individuals) who rea-
sonably feared they were subjected to violent threats.'92 Thus, this
tort should not be used to address speech that has commonly been
termed "group libel.
"193
Element (c) refers to attacks "reasonably" taken to encompass
threats of violence against the individual. This adopts the "victim's
perspective," which has been utilized in recent civil rights decisions
to evaluate the impact of intentionally harmful behavior. Why the
victim's perspective? First, as with the tort of assault and battery, it
is unimportant that the perpetrator intend the consequence of in-
191. See, e.g., Matsuda, supra note 2.
192. Thomas C. Grey, Discriminatory Harassment and Free Speech, 14 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. PoLY 157, 160-61 (1991).
193. Another preliminary issue concerns the reaction of bystanders to the threat of
violence. Although I do not make it part of my current proposal, I would be inclined to
follow the Restatement position on bystander reactions to intentionally inflicted emotional
distress.
Initially, it should be made clear that a "bystander" who is personally subjected to a
threat is not really a bystander; she is an immediate victim. So, the true bystander is one
to whom the threat was not directed. The Restatement treats immediate family members
differently than bystanders who are unrelated to the victim. Under the Restatement pro-
visions involving infliction of emotional distress, immediate family members have a cause
of action similar to that of the victim, if they show they suffered distress. Under the pro-
posed tort, family members would have a cause of action if they can show they reasonably
suffered fear of violence for their relative.
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jury; he need only intend that there be contact/attempted contact.
Second, as with the assault tort, it does not matter that the defen-
dant did not have the present ability to carry out the threat. It only
matters that the victim perceives that the defendant has the appar-
ent ability to carry out the assault/threat and that the plaintiff ap-
prehends harmful contact.194 What matters is what the victim un-
derstands. 95
I do not deny the importance of the speaker's intent and motive.
In fact, element (a) of the tort requires proof that the speaker in-
tended to threaten the recipient, and element (b) requires that the
speaker be motivated by "racial animus." But once such intentional
behavior and racial motivation are present, the greatest significance
is that the speaker was successful in bringing about the fear and in-
timidation experienced by the auditor.
Finally, as element (c) reflects, there is no requirement of proof
of likelihood of violent response. This tort does not depend on the
Supreme Court's definition of "fighting words,"19 6 or on some possi-
bility of retaliatory violence. A threat of racial violence may, of
course, be sufficient to trigger retaliation. If so, then a court will
likely need to consider whether the threat constituted provocation,
or whether it justified self-defensive preemptory attacks. 197 However,
this tort would not require that the plaintiff prove the defendant's
threat carried a likelihood of violence. There are three reasons for
this.
First, the crux of the tort is the fear and intimidation such
threats create in the listener, and not the remote possibility that the
listener will react violently. While the possibility of retaliatory, or
preemptive, violence is one type of harm that may arise from threats
of violence, it is not the only or even the principal type of harm likely
to result.
Second, threats of racial violence are often made under condi-
tions in which the person making the threat feels secure, while the
victim feels vulnerable. Consider, for example, the black family that
was given the Klan's "calling card" in the Texas coffee shop.19 There
194. See, e.g., HARPER ETAL., supra note 167, at 282.
195. There is also an analogy to the "reasonable woman" standard in sex harass-
ment cases. It does not matter that the male "perpetrator" did not "intend" to harm; what
matters is how the victim understood the behavior. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct.
367(1993).
196. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (defining, in
dicta, fighting words as those "which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite
an immediate breach of the peace").
197. Cf Tuberville v. Savage, 1 Mod. Rep. 3 (1669), in which the plaintiff claimed
the defendant provoked his response.
198. SIMS, supra note 106, at 167-72.
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is no reason to treat the fact that this particular black family got up
and left the restaurant instead of violently attacking the white man
as a reason not to punish the threat.199 Similarly, to weigh prob-
abilities that a mixed-race couple will, in the face of serious threats,
react with violence towards the perpetrator is to misunderstand the
harms-of coercion, emotional trauma and destruction of equal
rights to housing-that are truly at issue. As Kent Greenawalt puts
it in another context, the inquiry "should not concentrate on the per-
ceived capacity of a particular victim to respond physically."00
Third, some people are not inclined to fight or to risk further
abuse, even if they are deeply threatened by the words. One may
imagine that children when verbally attacked by adults, women
when threatened by men, or a single people set upon by several oth-
ers bearing threats, are not likely to retaliate with violence of their
own.21 Accordingly, the prospect of retaliation should not be a factor
in determining whether the conditions of this tort have been satis-
fied.
2. Comparison with other proposals. A number of other com-
mentators have made proposals that are broader than the proposal
advanced here.0 2 I do not intend to take a position on these propos-
als, but would point out some key differences between my proposal
and some proposals made by others. Richard Delgado, for example,
has proposed an action for racial insult, in which the plaintiff must
show that "[1language was addressed to him or her by the defendant
that was intended to demean through reference to race; that the
plaintiff understood as intended to demean through reference to
race; and that a reasonable person would recognize as a racial in-
sult.,
203
Delgado's proposal is broader in several ways than the proposal
set forth in this Article. He would make the crux of the tort language
199. Several other commentators have noted the "male-centeredness" of the fighting
words doctrine. See, e.g., Note, The Demise of the Chaplinsky Fighting Words Doctrine: An
Argument for its Internment, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1129 (1993); Lawrence, If He Hollers Let
Him Go, supra note 1.
200. Greenawalt, Insults and Epithets, supra note 1, at 297-98. See also Delgado,
Words That Wound, supra note 43; GREENAWALT, USES OF LANGUAGE supra note 34
(discussing "situation-altering" speech, such as conspiracies, orders, manipulative threats
and offers, and distinguishing them from ordinary assertions of fact and value); Note,
"The Demise of the Chaplinsky Fighting Words Doctrine: An Argument for its Intern-
ment," 106 HARV. L. REV. 1129 (1993).
201. See, e.g., Greenawalt, Insults and Epithets, supra note 1, at 293.
202. See, e.g., Delgado, Words That Wound, supra note 43; Love, supra note 186;
Matsuda, supra note 2; Brian Owsley, Racist Speech and "Reasonable People:" A Proposal
for a Tort Remedy, 24 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 323 (1993).
203. Delgado, Words That Wound, supra note 43, at 179.
19941 707
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
that "demean[s] by reference to race." My proposal is not designed to
address generally demeaning or insulting language, but only to tar-
get language which creates a threat of violence. Thus, Delgado's
proposal would almost always make racial epithets actionable, while
my proposal would make such an epithet actionable only if the
speaker intended it to be taken as a threat of violence and if, in
context, the listener perceived it as threatening violence.
Second, Delgado's proposal can be read to encompass public
speeches-not targeted at a particular individual-which insult or
demean listeners on grounds of race. Consider recent cable pro-
grams that feature rabid Nazis or militant black nationalists who
"direct" their venom at blacks, whites or Jews.0 4 A listener of such a
program would likely have a cause of action under Delgado's pro-
posed tort. But under the instant proposal, the listener would have
to prove that the words were "personally directed," as well as per-
sonally threatening, and not directed generally toward persons of
her race.
Mari Matsuda has extended Delgado's proposal to include
prosecution by the state. Matsuda identifies three characteristics of
speech which, in her view, should subject the perpetrator to criminal
prosecution: the message (1) is of racial inferiority; (2) is directed
against a historically oppressed group; and (3) is persecutory, hate-
ful and degrading.0 5
My proposal reflects three key differences with Matsuda's.
First, Matsuda, like Delgado, would target all messages of racial in-
feriority, while I would propose targeting only messages threatening
violence. Second, Matsuda does not require that the message be
"personally directed." Instead, she suggests that a claim that par-
ticular groups are inferior, made in a context of hatefulness, and en-
dorsing persecution of the targeted group, could be the subject of
prosecution.0 6
Third, Matsuda would limit the type of actionable messages to
those that are directed against "historically oppressed group[s]." My
proposal would not limit the tort in this way. Several critical race
theorists have powerfully argued that persons of color-subordi-
nated groups-have a different status than whites when expressing
racist hate. According to Matsuda, for example, because verbal rac-
ist attacks from subordinated persons are "not tied to the perpetu-
ation of racist vertical relationships," such attacks are generally less
troubling than attacks by dominant group members on subordinated
204. See Richard Zoglin, All You Need is Hate, TIME, June 21, 1993, at 63.
205. Matsuda, supra note 2, at 2357.
206. Matsuda would presumably disagree with the Court's decision in Brandenburg
v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (reversing syndicalism conviction of Klan leader).
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persons.0 7
In theory, this is a difficult argument to meet, especially if one
shares the view, as do I, that law derived from a particular historical
consciousness cannot abandon a racialist past merely by proclaiming
it is, henceforth, colorblind. The force of Matsuda's argument lies in
its claim to an historical narrative that connects the past of racism
with the present reality that people of color continue to struggle to
achieve equality. Moreover, one needs little empathy to recognize
that being in a privileged racial and economic class isolates one from
the worst of targeted abuse.08
Still, adopting a proposal such as Matsuda's creates thorny
problems, which include determining which groups may claim the
status of subordinated persons,0 9 whether privilege in one context
(e.g., economic or professional status) trumps subordination in an-
other (e.g., gender or ethnicity), and how to deal with hate speech di-
rected by one subordinated group member to a member of another
subordinated group. With respect to this last problem, one need look
no further than the acute inter-group conflicts between some Kore-
an-Americans and some African-Americans in Los Angeles. 10 In
addition to these concerns, there is also the indelicate problem of
207. Matsuda, supra note 2, at 2361-62.
208. See Greenawalt, Insults and Epithets, supra note 1, at 300.
209. There is, in addition, the fundamental problem that Matsuda does not address:
the social construction of race. If, as I read Matsuda, "subordinated persons" is to be a le-
gal category, and not just rhetorical play, one will soon confront conflicts among different
groups in which the validity of the claim to legal redress hinges on proof of subordinated
status. Which group member can claim the status? A person of Korean ancestry or a per-
son of Chinese ancestry? Can a Polish American claim subordinated status with respect
to Italian-Americans? Can a Chinese-American who speaks Cantonese claim subordinate
status vis-a-vis Mandarin Chinese-Americans? See Gates, supra note 7, at 37.
210. One of the principle ethnic conflicts in Los Angeles has been between black and
Korean individuals, which has spawned inter-community conflict. See Bill Boyarsky, Ra-
cial Conflict Brutalizes L.A. Politics, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 14, 1992, at B2 (stating, "[tirapped
by poverty and without much hope, the races engage in combat they see as their only way
out"); Stephen Braun & Ashley Dunn, View of Model Multiethnic City Vanishes in Smoke;
Relations: Disturbances Bare a Simmering Racial Anger that Community Efforts Never
Fully Quelled, L.A. TIMES, May 1, 1992, at Al, A28 (reporting exacerbated tension in
wake of riot and because groups "are all jockeying for position in the scramble to win a
limited supply of jobs, dwellings and economic opportunities"); Jake Doherty, Black-Ko-
rean Alliance Says Talk Not Enough, Disbands, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1992, at Al
(reporting that group dedicated to easing ethnic tension between African Americans and
Korean Americans disbanded because members decided that the group's focus on dialogue
was not enough to improve relationship between the communities); Andrea Ford, Kore-
ans, Blacks Try to Forge Alliance, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1992, at Bi (reporting that, in af-
termath of riots, community activists seek to transcend hardened racial attitudes and
great ethnic divide); Susan Moffat, Splintered Society: U.S. Asians; The L.A. Ribts High-
lighted Tensions Among Asian-American Groups, Split by Longstanding Enmities and
Generational Conflict. A Search is Underway for a Common Voice, L.A. TIMES, July 14,
1992, at Al.
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defining the racial categories (identifying who has standing to sue,
and who may be sued) without slipping into the trap of accepting a
particular social construction of "race."21' It is impossible to resolve
these deep theoretical conflicts using formal rule structures like
those Matsuda proposes. 2  Attempting to do so would, at best, fo-
ment conflict between socially-constructed racial groups over the
pointless question of which group has the most repressed past.
213
Consequently, I would not make the availability of the tort rest upon
a formal finding of the plaintiffs subordinated racial status.
There is, however, an additional reason not to limit the tort:
threats of violence undermine the ability of anyone to function as a
communicative human being. This result is justified by more than
an appeal to formal equality, a common argument made in allowing
whites (or, in the case of sex harassment, men) to bring suits under
various civil rights statutes. 14 Rather, my argument is that racially-
motivated threats of violence are sufficiently severe and disabling
for all who face them. Recognizing that it is possible for whites as
well as non-whites to be subjected to serious threats of racial
violence, I would not limit the protections of the tort to members of
subordinated groups.
211. See, e.g., MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED
STATES FROM THE 1960'S TO THE 1980'S 3 (1986); Clara E. Rodriguez and Hector Cordero-
Guzman, Placing Race in Context, 15 ETHNIC AND RACIAL STUDIES 523 (1992) (asserting
that "race" is a fluid term the meaning of which continually shifts from one context to an-
other). On these questions, I have benefitted from research by Danny Chou, a 1994
graduate of Harvard Law School.
212. Formal rule structures do not lend themselves to resolving legal problems in
which a matrix of competing or contradictory factors must be balanced against each other
to achieve a result, and no single factor must be minimally satisfied. See, e.g., Louis
Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 1992 DUKE L.J. 557. For an ac-
count and critique of judicial balancing of interests and values in response to the short-
comings of legal formalism in constitutional law, see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitu-
tional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987).
213. Gates, supra note 7, at 41-42.
214. The Court has held that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 allow suits charging racial discrimination to be brought by either white or non-
white plaintiffs. Sex discrimination suits may also be brought by either men or women.
See Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 950 (1971); Wright v. Methodist Youth Services, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 307 (N.D.Ill.
1981). Similarly, equal protection challenges may be undertaken by either whites or non-
whites and by either men or women. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 140 (1976). In some cases of
so-called "reverse discrimination" the Court has allowed members of the dominant group
to challenge affirmative action programs. See Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989)
(subjecting race-based affirmative action plans to the same strict scrutiny as governmen-
tal actions that intentionally discriminate against racial minorities); University of Cali-
fornia Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (sustaining equal protection challenge by
white male to special admissions programs for minority applicants to the Medical School
of the University of California at Davis).
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Nonetheless, racial difference might enter into consideration of
how "threatening" a given threat is.215 The word "honkey" directed at
a white person carries a lot less baggage and force-value than the
word "n -" directed at a black person. 6 Because of the history of
Klan activity in this country, and the fact that a black person is a
racial minority, one may conclude that the fear a black person might
harbor as a result of a racial threat might indeed be more severe
than a similar threat leveled against a white person. 7 Conse-
quently, while my proposal is "symmetrical" in form, in practice-
and consistent with the emphasis on context-those who should be
most benefitted are those who are subjected to the most serious
threats. 8
CONCLUSION
There are great virtues in shifting the debate over hate speech
from the question whether to institute "politically correct" speech to
a question of whether to regulate assaultive speech that threatens
violence. The question, "should speech with racist content be re-
stricted?" is very different from the question, "assuming threats of
violence can be sanctioned, is the following threat of sufficient
magnitude to warrant regulation by the state?" The first question
generates much abstract argument which, in the end, merely repro-
duces the competing paradigms that underlie the hate speech de-
bate. The second requires consideration of specific circumstances
that may or not warrant regulation. Making the discussion specific
or particularized does not resolve the hate speech dilemma, but it
allows one to engage in debate over the relevance of particular fac-
tors to the resolution of a concrete, narrowly-defined problem. In
other words, this Article illustrates how one might think about other
types of hate speech regulation.
215. For a similar approach, analyzing Stanford's "fighting words" regulation, see
Thomas C. Grey, Discriminatory Harassment and Free Speech, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
PoLy 157 (1991).
216. See Greenawalt, Insults and Epithets, supra note 1, at 300. In his book,
Greenawalt makes the same point about personally directed racial slurs: "Those who rest
secure in a majority and favored status can accept the denigrating terms and appraisals
that apply to their privileged position with much more equanimity than those who feel
that the terms reflect widespread distaste for the group to which they belong."
GREENAWALT, USES OF LANGUAGE, supra note 34, at 147-48.
217. Compare the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, in which the
relative position of power of the victim versus the perpetrator is one factor to be taken
into account in determining how "outrageous" the behavior is. See supra part III.A.2.




Thus, I have suggested that the debate over hate speech should
be structured in a way that both narrows the inquiry and permits
specific circumstances to be brought into play. Even if one limits the
inquiry (as I have done in this Article) to racist speech of a threaten-
ing nature, one cannot decide whether certain speech is sufficiently
threatening, harassing or intimidating without evaluating the
speech in context.219 Evaluating speech on this basis requires a case-
by-case approach that does not lend itself to universal rules stated
in advance, then mechanically applied. Indeed, regulating speech is
one arena in which it would seem that the more general and ab-
stract the regulatory proposition, the more likely it is to be wrong.
220
A contextual methodology is a means to bridge the gap between
the opposite poles of the hate speech debate. The point of the ap-
proach is to focus on specific situations and specific factors, both in
determining whether a certain kind of (hate) speech should be out-
side the First Amendment or subject to some form of regulation, and
in determining whether there has been a violation (i.e., resolving the
question whether something is a threat of violence). I have proposed
resort to tort law as the best (and most familiar) mechanism for
putting into practice this methodology. The proposed tort requires
that courts evaluate specific incidents (looking at factors made rele-
vant by the tort itself) and determine, based on context, whether
there is a racially-motivated threat of violence. Consistent with the
contextual emphasis of the proposed tort, I have not generalized to
other kinds of racist speech (e.g., speech directed to a crowd rather
than personally directed, speech that is merely a racial epithet), but
remain open (though presumptively opposed) to creation of new torts
if a specific inquiry reveals the need for further expansion.
The complexity of carrying out an inquiry into speech regula-
tion--even one as narrow as this one-leads to a further reflection
on the process by which any hate speech regulations beyond verbal
threats of violence might be adopted. My caution about speech
regulations generally, coupled with my faith in (or hope for) com-
municative rationality, leads me to distrust proposals that justify
broad speech regulation. So, from my perspective, any regulations of
hate speech should propose narrow, incremental changes that can be
219. In a university setting, for example (which is a setting that, in turn, is different
from a workplace or public park), a court might evaluate a rule made for the dormitories
much differently than a rule made for the classroom (in session), or for communications
outside buildings on sidewalks. As the circumstances differ, the strength of the regulatory
interests differs.
220. See supra part I.C addressing First Amendment concerns raised and met by a
contextual approach. See also Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic
Regulation: Away from a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 NW. U. L. REV.
1212, 1254 (1983).
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justified and that can be cabined. An incremental method can be a
principled approach to speech problems, particularly in a highly
contested arena such as hate speech. As we saw with racially-moti-
vated threats of violence, the significant countervailing principles
(equality vs. free expression) makes principled judgment among
larger categories of speech difficult. Since our system is pledged to
remain faithful to both principles, it is not possible simply to choose
one principle over another.
Moreover, we inevitably have trouble predicting how far gen-
eral rules will carry us, especially when the rules involve inherently-
malleable communications. A priori rules appear superficially at-
tractive, particularly to those who want to avoid speech regulations
that distinguish among classes of speech based on content. However,
since threats of violence are currently subject to regulation because
of their compelling harms, the question of whether similarly serious
harms would justify further content restrictions on hate speech can-
not simply be dismissed as fanciful.
Finally, an incremental approach seems desirable because the
decisionmaker's attention would be focused on a narrow category of
speech in which the competing concerns can be thoughtfully as-
sessed. The risk of a bad decision is thereby lessened; but even if a
bad decision is made, the resulting harm to norms of either equality
or free speech is reduced.
In sum, because of the inherent complexity and ambiguity of
speech,2 I am distrustful of a theoretical approach that would
either a priori establish all regulation of the content of violent
speech to be invalid, or generally set racist speech into a category of
its own for special regulation. Although the ambiguity of speech
makes any restriction on speech problematic, the difficulty of antici-
pating how222 a regulation will be used, and delineating its limiting
principles, is dramatically increased when the regulation is stated at
a higher level of abstraction. This is why I find a pragmatic, prob-
lem-specific approach-as reflected in the proposed tort of racially-
motivated threats of violence-much more appealing in addressing
the hate speech dilemma: it is not that scholars like the critical race
theorists are wrong; it is that their brush is too broad to accommo-
date all the significant constitutional and practical considerations.
221. See CHEVIGNY, supra note 80.
222. Or against which groups. See, e.g., Karst, supra note 4, at 109-16; Strossen, su-
pra note 1, at 556.
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